Following the ethnic cleansing and complete depopulation of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh carried out by Azerbaijan in September 2023, anti-Western rhetoric has increasingly dominated the discourse of the country’s top leadership. Baku has accused several Western democratic nations of bias, harboring anti-Azerbaijani sentiments, and exerting pressure, taking steps to weaken their involvement in the region. Simultaneously, Azerbaijan has intensified its efforts to strengthen relations with authoritarian states.
Azerbaijan Versus the West
These shifts in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy became particularly evident starting in October 2023. Baku initiated a process to marginalize European involvement in the Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization efforts. President Aliyev boycotted the planned meeting on October 5 in Granada, which was set to take place within the framework of the European Political Community’s third summit and included leaders from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Germany, France, and the EU—a meeting that had been agreed upon months earlier. Later in October, Azerbaijan declined to participate in the tripartite meeting organized by the President of the European Council, effectively ending European mediation efforts.
Tensions also arose in November 2023 with the United States. During hearings held by the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State James O’Brien stated that after September 19, nothing with Azerbaijan would proceed as usual unless progress was made toward peace. Baku interpreted this statement as a blow to bilateral relations, noting that the relationship could no longer continue as it had before.
Anti-Western rhetoric persisted into 2024 as well. President Aliyev asserted that a coalition of anti-Azerbaijani forces had formed in Europe, claiming that at least three countries had declared a cold war against Azerbaijan. While he did not specify which countries he referred to, it is clear that one of them, according to Aliyev, is France, with whom Azerbaijan’s relations have significantly deteriorated. The comprehensive development of Armenian-French relations is perceived by Baku as a threat, prompting Azerbaijan to engage in a hybrid conflict against Paris. This effort includes not only extensive anti-French information campaigns but also support for separatist movements in France’s overseas territories through the newly established platform known as the “Baku Initiative Group.”
During this period, Azerbaijan has openly targeted the Netherlands, Canada, Luxembourg, and all other countries that have expressed support for Armenia or condemned Azerbaijan’s aggressive policies. Even European institutions, such as the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and individual European officials like Josep Borrell, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, have been in Baku’s sights.
Azerbaijan has reacted harshly to international cooperation with Armenia in the military sphere. Military-technical agreements, joint military exercises, and even non-military support from the European Peace Facility are portrayed by Azerbaijan as Armenia’s militarization, a disruption of the peace process, and an attempt to destabilize the region.
Azerbaijan openly opposes the activities of the EU Civilian Mission in Armenia, accusing it of bias, causing tensions, and even espionage. Baku finds the extension of the mission’s mandate and its expansion unacceptable, particularly as these steps were taken without its consent, and demands the mission’s withdrawal from the Armenian-Azerbaijani border.
Azerbaijan’s New Strategic Partners and Allies
Alongside the intensification of its anti-Western rhetoric, Azerbaijan has also reassessed its foreign policy priorities over the past year. This shift was announced by President Aliyev in February 2024 during his fifth inauguration ceremony, where he stated that “Azerbaijan is not awaited anywhere, and its only family is the Turkic world.”
In the past year, Baku has taken concrete steps in this direction. In March, Azerbaijan signed a strategic partnership agreement in the energy sector with Kazakhstan “(They established a strategic partnership in 2022)”. In April, it signed a declaration with Kyrgyzstan to establish a “Deep Strategic Partnership.” In May, Azerbaijan formed a strategic partnership with Tajikistan, and by August, it had established allied relations with Uzbekistan “(Azerbaijan signed a declaration of strategic partnership with Turkmenistan back in 2017.)”.
Azerbaijan continues to consistently develop its allied relationships with Turkey, Russia, and Pakistan. In July of this year, Azerbaijan signed a strategic partnership declaration with China, elevating bilateral relations to a new level.
Notably, Baku’s anti-Western stance does not entirely preclude the possibility of cooperation with European countries. Azerbaijan has focused on strengthening ties with Southern and Eastern European nations, though these relationships are built less on political foundations and more on economic, particularly energy-based, cooperation. Currently, Azerbaijan supplies gas to five EU member states—Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Hungary, and Romania. From these countries, Azerbaijan expects support within the European Union in defending its interests, considering the EU’s decision-making process is based on the principle of consensus.
Foundations of Anti-Western Posture
The shift in Azerbaijan’s anti-Western positioning and changes in foreign policy priorities are influenced by several factors.
Firstly, the new status quo in the region plays a crucial role. Previously, Azerbaijan had to consider the factor of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict when shaping its foreign policy, striving to maintain constructive relations with all power centers, particularly the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group. In light of new realities, this constraint no longer exists.
Moreover, the Azerbaijani side now permits itself to respond quite harshly to any criticism or statements issued by these actors regarding aggression against Armenia.
Furthermore, the Azerbaijani side permits itself to respond quite harshly to any criticism or statements from these actors concerning aggression against Armenia, ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh, the rights of the Armenian population in Artsakh, or Armenian prisoners of war.
Another reason for Azerbaijan’s anti-Western positioning is of an internal political nature. One potential threat to Aliyev’s familial regime is the accumulation of longstanding issues in the country, including human rights abuses, corruption, and social polarization. For this reason, the authorities attempt to suppress any attempts at public expression of discontent, targeting the remnants of civil society with persecution. In just the past year, over three dozen journalists and activists have been arrested in Azerbaijan, most of whom, notably, are charged with currency smuggling. This is precisely how the funding schemes of various democratic foundations or governments are characterized, through which Azerbaijani activists receive support. Azerbaijani propaganda outlets portray the struggle for human rights and freedom of speech as an attempt to destabilize the country, labeling civil activists and independent journalists as “agents of Western influence.”
Azerbaijan’s anti-Western rhetoric also stems from its strategy to weaken Western involvement in the region. Baku positions itself as a regional hegemon, insisting that all powers interested in the South Caucasus must coordinate their actions with it. This is not merely a matter of principle; the presence and engagement of the United States, the European Union, France, and other actors in the region serve as deterrents for Baku, which seeks to extricate itself from such influences by all possible means. This demand for the cessation of the EU mission in Armenia fits squarely within that logic.
In summary, we can note that Azerbaijan’s new positioning will likely be maintained at least in the short term. These trends need to be systematically analyzed and taken into account in the process of developing Armenia’s regional and foreign policy.
Author: RCSP associate expert Narek Minasyan
Photo from The Insider website
