Introduction
The victory of former President Donald Trump in the U.S. presidential elections creates a new geopolitical reality, not only for the United States but also for the entire world. Although Trump previously served as president from 2017 to 2020, providing a general understanding of his foreign policy orientations, his potential new term is often characterized as one fraught with “equally significant uncertainties.”
The spectrum of foreign policy positions likely to be adopted by the new U.S. administration could have markedly distinct impacts on the current trajectory of Armenian-Russian relations. These effects are poised to prompt not only bilateral but also significant regional shifts. Consequently, a linear analysis of the potential impacts of Trump’s foreign policy alternatives is of paramount importance for addressing anticipated challenges and capitalizing on emerging opportunities.
Trump’s “Isolationist” Policy (2017-2020) and Armenian-Russian Relations
During Donald Trump’s first term as president, his foreign policy was characterized as “isolationist,” which had minimal practical impact on Armenian-Russian relations.
In 2017-2018, Armenia’s foreign policy remained largely unilateral. In the realm of security, Armenia relied heavily on its bilateral agreements with Russia and its partnership within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Procurement of military equipment, modernization of the armed forces, and professional development of personnel were predominantly focused in a single direction. Among other geopolitical collaborations, the Armenia-NATO partnership deserves mention, though it remained segmented and lacked systemic integration.
Economically, Armenia was undergoing a transition to the regulatory framework of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). This transitional period had its distinct characteristics. Armenia’s closed, monopolistic, and corruption-laden economic system integrated seamlessly into a similar structure within the EAEU, which, despite its inefficiencies, ensured modest but stable economic growth.
Politically, Armenia was perceived as a “satellite” state of Russia. This perception largely persisted even after the “Velvet Revolution” of 2018. During a regional visit in October 2018, U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton, while in Yerevan, effectively subordinated U.S.-Armenian relations to U.S.-Georgian and U.S.-Azerbaijani relations, despite acknowledging Armenia’s democratic transition. Furthermore, Bolton suggested exploring U.S.-Armenian economic relations through the private sector, implicitly pointing to the insurmountable economic integration between Armenia and Russia at the state level.Between 2018 and 2020, Armenian-Russian relations remained largely unchanged. Armenia’s new government initially refrained from making significant shifts in foreign policy, resulting in an inertia-driven trajectory for bilateral relations across various sectors. Even during the 44-day war in 2020, then-President Trump’s statements on Armenia and the conflict—delivered amidst a heated presidential campaign—were primarily declarative and aimed at domestic audiences. Unsurprisingly, the proposal to deploy “Scandinavian peacekeepers” in Artsakh did not garner serious discussion within Armenia.
In summary, Trump’s first term had little to no substantive impact on Armenian-Russian relations. This stability stemmed primarily from the consistent foreign policy orientation pursued by successive Armenian administrations, which emphasized comprehensive cooperation with Russia across all sectors. Alternative partnerships were viewed as sources of “added value” rather than as substitutes, while the security sector was deemed exclusively under Russian purview.
Another factor contributing to the lack of U.S. influence on Armenian-Russian relations was the United States’ prioritization of Georgia as its strategic partner in the South Caucasus. Georgia was perceived as the primary conduit for promoting Western values and civilization in the region, serving as a counterbalance to Russia’s expanding influence.
Trump’s “Isolationist” policy also played a significant role in the lack of U.S. involvement. This approach, rooted in a “business logic,” emphasized political engagement only in areas where tangible economic benefits could be achieved. It is worth noting that the South Caucasus, as a whole, did not present substantial economic potential. This, among other factors, contributed to the United States’ relative political passivity in the region during the 2017-2020 period.
Foundations and Signals of a New Regional Landscape
As Donald Trump potentially assumes office in 2025, the South Caucasus finds itself in a significantly altered geopolitical configuration. These new dynamics are poised to shape Trump’s regional policies, both in multilateral and bilateral frameworks. Compared to the circumstances of 2020, five key factors have emerged, fundamentally transforming the region:
1․ The outcomes of the 44-day war and subsequent developments have reshaped Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. The two nations are nearing the conclusion of a peace agreement, which could significantly diminish Russia’s leverage and avenues for influence in the region.
2․ The aftermath of the war has driven a substantial wedge between Armenia and Russia. Armenia’s new security challenges and Russia’s response have compelled Yerevan to seek alternative sources of security, resulting in significant shifts in Armenian foreign policy.
3․ Although the European Union granted Georgia candidate status for EU membership in December 2023, the ruling party’s retreat from its pro-European path has led to domestic political crises following nationwide elections. These internal developments may critically affect Georgia’s future geopolitical role in the region.
4․ On the brink of the fourth year of the Russia-Ukraine war, Moscow’s declining role in regional decision-making has enabled greater influence from other actors, including the United States, Iran, Turkey, China, France, and the European Union.
5․ China has signed a strategic partnership agreement with Azerbaijan and is implementing large-scale infrastructure projects in Georgia. These actions highlight China’s active pursuit of the “Middle Corridor” initiative, aiming to establish a key transport and trade route through the region.
Alternatives for Interpreting and Responding to the New Situation and Armenian-Russian Relations
Essentially, there are three possible alternatives for Donald Trump’s foreign policy approach toward the South Caucasus:
1․ Adopting Biden Administration’s Approach
In this scenario, the U.S. could continue the Biden administration’s strategy, focusing on the gradual reduction of Russian influence in the region. For Armenian-Russian relations, this would likely result in the steady diversification of Armenia’s foreign policy orientation. However, given the unfolding events in Georgia and China’s increasing presence, this approach entails significant risks, including Armenia’s potential “isolation” in terms of democracy and infrastructure. Such isolation could, in turn, provoke Russia to generate new challenges for Armenia.
2․ Shifting the Western Focal Point from Georgia to Armenia
Trump could aim to relocate the Western strategic focus of 2017-2020 from Georgia to Armenia, paving the way for multifaceted developments such as enhanced physical and psychological security, economic diversification, and reduced political dependence. This approach could also prioritize launching regional infrastructure projects, potentially encouraging the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. A foundation for this might be the continuation of the April 5, 2024, U.S.-Armenia-Europe meeting, which is crucial for economic diversification. However, such a shift could lead to the rapid and significant erosion of Armenian-Russian relations, presenting Armenia with substantial risks and challenges.
3․ Drastic Reduction of U.S. Interest in the Region
The worst-case scenario involves the U.S. sharply diminishing its interest in the South Caucasus, reverting to a “policy of isolation” and focusing solely on “business diplomacy.” Under these conditions, Armenia would face challenges not only from Azerbaijan but also from Russian hybrid operations. This would likely reinforce Russia’s dominant role in Armenian-Russian relations, increasing Russian influence at the expense of Armenia’s political, economic, and strategic interests. However, considering the anti-China sentiment among prospective officials in Trump’s administration, the “Middle Corridor” project might still attract significant attention. This suggests that the South Caucasus could remain within Trump’s direct sphere of interest, mitigating the likelihood of the worst-case scenario.
Conclusion
Regardless of the U.S. policy trajectory, new threats and challenges from Russia toward Armenia appear inevitable. In this context, Yerevan’s primary task is to “do its homework,” which involves assessing capabilities, gathering resources, preparing, and developing scenario-based strategies to respond effectively to various challenges. Simultaneously, it is crucial to maintain and, if possible, advance the Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani normalization processes.
Trump’s potential second term, while bringing risks and challenges, will also present opportunities. Armenia’s ability to capitalize on these opportunities will determine the balance between achievements and losses over the next four years.
Photo by EVN Report
Author: RCSP expert Robert Gevondyan
