The new phase of the normalization process between Armenia and Azerbaijan began in 2020, following the end of the Second Artsakh War and the November 9 trilateral statement. This period can be divided into three main phases:
- Normalization through Russian mediation (late 2020-September 2022): main topics included unblocking (from January 2021), delimitation (May 2022)
- Normalization through Western mediation (September 2022-September 2023): recognition of territorial integrity, peace treaty
- Bilateral format normalization (December 2023-present): delimitation, peace treaty
The first topic of relations became the unblocking of regional communications, for which a special commission[i] headed by deputy prime ministers was established after the trilateral meeting in Moscow in January 2021. In November 2021, following the Sochi meeting, the parties also agreed to renounce the use of force and promote the activation of the peace treaty process[ii].
After the May 2022 border incidents, a new format of relations emerged with the creation of delimitation commissions, whose first meeting took place on May 24 at the Yeraskh-Sadarak interstate border section[iii].
After the meeting in Prague, the parties indicated that the peace treaty could be signed by the end of the year[iv].
This period was characterized by military escalations on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and in Nagorno-Karabakh. This phase ended in September 2023 with Azerbaijan establishing military control over all of NK.
Peace Treaty
In 2024, parallel to the delimitation process, official statements regarding the signing of a peace treaty intensified. In June-July 2024, the Azerbaijani side proposed signing a framework document that would establish fundamental principles of settlement. The Armenian side proposed a comprehensive peace treaty. On August 7, 2024, it became clear that the parties had agreed to remove the point about unblocking communications from the peace treaty text. In September 2024, the Armenian side was proposing to sign the peace treaty with the agreed points (14 out of 17), while the Azerbaijani side rejected the proposal, speaking about a comprehensive peace treaty. Meanwhile, on August 31, 2024, two months later than scheduled, the regulations for the delimitation commissions were signed. The main developments in this phase were the growing uncertainty about the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the foreign policy field and the pre-election process in the US. The efforts of the outgoing US administration to encourage Baku to sign a peace treaty by the end of the year proved futile.
Contents of the Peace Treaty
Although most of the content of the 17 articles in the discussed peace treaty is unknown, it can be assumed that its structure is based on already voiced fundamental principles:
- Mutual recognition of territorial integrity and sovereignty
- Inviolability of borders and border delimitation
- Security guarantees and establishment of the principle of peaceful resolution of all disputes in accordance with the UN Charter. Not to be a threat to each other and not to provide one’s territory to other parties (this can also include the unagreed point about removing third forces from the border) for such purposes
- Establishment of diplomatic relations
- Legal force of relationship regulation documents over domestic legislation (according to N. Pashinyan’s interview[v])
- Mutual cancellation of claims in international courts
- Economic cooperation
- Humanitarian and cultural issues.
The Parties’ Position on These Issues
Armenian side: The issue of the status and security guarantees for the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh was the main topic of the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement process for the Armenian side until October 2022. The Azerbaijani aggression against Armenia on September 13, 2022, created a new situation in this regard, forcing official Yerevan to revise its positions and seek solutions to guarantee Armenia’s security and territorial integrity.
The Armenian side accepts all fundamental principles and points that provide for the establishment of the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty and inviolability of borders of the parties, as well as the unblocking of all communications based on these principles. The Armenian side completely renounces the use of force and limits the means used in the negotiation process to diplomatic channels.
The Azerbaijani Side: The official position of the Azerbaijani side contains the following demands:
- Mutual cancellation of claims in international courts
- Removal of third-party forces from the Armenian-Azerbaijani border (referring to the European Union Mission in Armenia–EUMA)
These two demands are effectively being made within the framework of the peace treaty. Additionally, the Azerbaijani side is voicing other demands at various official levels, including:
- Changes to Armenia’s Constitution
- Liquidation of the OSCE Minsk Group
- Suspension of Armenia’s “militarization”
- The “Zangezur Corridor” (regardless of format – the difference in status of the route through Meghri compared to other communication routes)
- Promotion of the “Western Azerbaijan” thesis
- Reparations
The last two topics can be viewed as tools for exerting additional pressure on the Armenian side to prevent the long-term rehabilitation of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.
Noting Azerbaijan’s low motivation to sign a peace treaty, I propose several scenarios for developments around Armenian-Azerbaijani relations and the peace treaty.
Peace Without a Peace Treaty
First Scenario: This scenario assumes low involvement of external forces (EU, US, Russia, Turkey). Bilateral negotiations around the peace treaty suggest a long, tough competitive process, mainly under pressure from Azerbaijan and the presentation of new demands or formal and informal requirements. Nevertheless, in the long term, this scenario assumes slow de-escalation. This conclusion is based on the following premise: before militarily capturing the NK territory, Azerbaijan initiated low and medium-intensity military escalations, which changed dramatically after September 2023. It can be assumed that this trend will continue in the mentioned phase as well: Baku will not pursue medium-intensity escalations and will reduce low-intensity escalations, although the threat of force will remain in Azerbaijan’s “diplomatic vocabulary” to maintain continuous pressure on Armenia and expect concessions.
The goal of this strategy is to get the maximum by maintaining constant pressure on Armenia, while also trying to understand how stable and final the status quo established after 2023 is.
Assuming that political developments after signing the peace treaty will be irreversible, leading to normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations, unblocking of communications, and Armenia’s economic development, the Azerbaijani side is trying to get the maximum price, understanding that after this, it will be impossible to use the blackmail leverages characteristic of the current phase.
Although this model of relations is sometimes compared to Russian-Japanese relations – with manifestations of economic, diplomatic, and other types of interstate cooperation in the absence of a peace treaty – we believe that such a model in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations is impossible without signing a peace treaty or another fundamental document replacing it.
Second Scenario: External involvement with active participation of Western actors (US, EU). Such intervention assumes implementation of fundamental principles and this model can be called “dignified peace.” It includes territorial integrity, establishment of diplomatic relations, mutual security guarantees, comprehensive unblocking of infrastructure while maintaining the principle of sovereignty, economic cooperation and involvement in East-West transport and economic international programs, cooperation on humanitarian and cultural issues.
Third Scenario: Involvement of the Russian Federation in case of certain results achieved by the Russian side in Ukraine. This mediation means regulation of some elements of relations (partial unblocking, delimitation through Russian mediation, etc.) mainly on terms favorable to Azerbaijan, while avoiding final and comprehensive solutions. The main challenge for the Armenian side is the rehabilitation of the so-called “Zangezur Corridor” issue under Russian control. However, since the main hypothesis is the fundamental nature of the conflict of interests between the Azerbaijani and Russian sides, in my opinion, in such a development, Azerbaijan will try to use the Russian factor to exert additional pressure on Armenia, but in the long term is not interested in strengthening Russian presence on the ground. Russian strengthening in these scenarios can also be viewed as a threat by Turkey.
Fourth Scenario: The fourth scenario is Turkey’s mediation in the Armenian-Azerbaijani normalization process, which also implies a more balanced approach to the positions of the parties. Here it should be noted that Turkey is interested in the final settlement of the conflict, which will lead to the unblocking of regional communications. However, without active US efforts and good relations with the West, from which that country can also receive military and economic support, the Turkish side alone does not have sufficient motivation to pressure Azerbaijan and become a more neutral mediator. Nevertheless, I believe that Turkey’s involvement is possible at some stage of Armenian-Azerbaijani normalization, and in some technical issues – inevitable (infrastructure unblocking).
I have ranked the proposed scenarios according to assumed probability – from higher to lower likelihood.
Conclusion
The Armenian-Azerbaijani normalization process, having gone through several phases, has settled on a bilateral format with episodic external mediation. After establishing full military control over NK, Azerbaijan’s motivation to continue frequent medium-intensity escalations has decreased and can be assumed to continue to have low probability. On the other hand, political pressure and the threat of using military tools will continue to remain in official Baku’s toolkit, aimed at forcing Armenia to make as many concessions as possible. The Armenian side, for its part, while accepting the basic principles of settlement, will continue to insist on their implementation. Without external intervention and additional pressure on either side, this situation in 2025 implies a continuation of the situation characteristic of 2024 – perhaps with some progress in the delimitation process.
[i] https://www.primeminister.am/hy/foreign-visits/item/2021/01/11/Nikol-Pashinyan-visit-to-Moscow/
[ii] https://www.primeminister.am/ru/foreign-visits/item/2021/11/26/Nikol-Pashinyan-visit-to-Sochi./
[iii] https://shorturl.at/h3V4p
[iv] https://shorturl.at/lYdtd
[v] https://armenpress.am/hy/article/1207904
Author: RCSP associate expert Samvel Meliksetyan
