In recent weeks, Azerbaijan’s political leadership has intensified its rhetoric regarding Armenia. This shift became particularly evident in interviews given by Ilham Aliyev to Russian state television on December 18[i] and to local media on January 7[ii]. Despite targeting different audiences, these interviews shared similar anti-Armenian narratives.
Azerbaijan’s belligerent rhetoric is not new. However, Aliyev’s recent statements stand out for two reasons: they follow a period of relatively moderate rhetoric, and they reflect a noticeable hardening of demands on certain issues.
The escalation in rhetoric from Baku can be attributed to several key factors. First, the United Nations Climate Conference (COP29) held in Baku in November 2024 significantly influenced Azerbaijan’s approach. During the preparatory and organizational phases of COP29, and to ensure its successful execution, Azerbaijan made considerable efforts to position itself as a constructive, peace-seeking nation. As a result, Azerbaijani rhetoric softened, and the situation along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border stabilized, making 2024 arguably the most peaceful year since 2020. However, following the conference, the constraints on Azerbaijan’s leadership were lifted, and Aliyev reverted to his belligerent, anti-Armenian rhetoric.
Another factor in Aliyev’s escalated rhetoric is the aim to increase pressure on Armenia in the peace negotiations. While the two sides have reportedly agreed on about 90% of the draft peace treaty, two issues remain unresolved: the non-deployment of third-party forces along the border and the withdrawal of mutual legal claims from international courts. Armenia has proposed signing the treaty without the unresolved clauses, but Azerbaijan rejected this. Despite Armenia offering new proposals, Azerbaijan has yet to respond for over two months.
The unresolved clauses are not the treaty’s most critical issues, suggesting that Azerbaijan’s approach is a tactic to delay signing the peace treaty. This is further supported by the additional demands placed on Armenia by Azerbaijani leadership, including restrictions on arms purchases, the return of acquired weapons, the return of so-called “Western Azerbaijanis,” and the provision of the “Zangezur Corridor.” In recent interviews, Aliyev highlighted two specific demands as preconditions for signing the treaty: the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group and amendments to Armenia’s Constitution.
The continuous presentation of new demands is part of Azerbaijan’s hardened rhetoric and stance, undermining efforts to establish peace in the region. Despite this unconstructive approach, Baku continues to accuse Armenia of lacking constructiveness or undermining the process.
A third factor behind Azerbaijan’s escalated rhetoric is global developments. Statements by newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump have created significant turmoil in international relations and raised concerns even among Washington’s closest allies. Trump’s foreign policy, centered on the “America First” principle, could lead to a new balance of power in various regions. In the Middle East, notable shifts include Iran’s weakened position, Israel’s ongoing military operations, and Turkey’s growing influence. Meanwhile, discussions around freezing the Ukraine conflict, with potential territorial losses for Ukraine, have intensified amid Russia’s advances.
From Aliyev’s perspective, these developments prioritize the use of force over international law. Furthermore, shifting global priorities and reduced involvement by major powers in the South Caucasus provide Azerbaijan with an opportunity to act more freely, using force and threats to achieve its goals. Aliyev’s interviews included narratives aimed at legitimizing potential aggression against Armenia, such as labeling Armenia a fascist state, accusing it of initiating an arms race, portraying it as a regional threat, and framing it as a geographical obstacle to Turkish-Azerbaijani connectivity.
Notably, Azerbaijan’s actions extend beyond rhetoric. While complaining about Armenia’s armament, Aliyev continues to militarize Azerbaijan. Since the 2020 war, Azerbaijan has increased its defense budget annually, with a record $5 billion allocated for 2025.
This suggests that Azerbaijan has not fundamentally abandoned the possibility of using force against Armenia. Under favorable international conditions, it may pursue new aggressive actions.
The intensification of rhetoric also serves domestic purposes for Azerbaijan’s leadership. Fostering an external enemy image helps maintain nationalist sentiment and manage social tensions. Anti-Armenian rhetoric amplified by state-controlled media diverts attention from domestic issues such as corruption, economic challenges, and human rights violations.
In contrast, the Armenian side has adopted a strategy of de-escalation and emphasized its constructiveness, as reflected in Prime Minister Pashinyan’s interviews with Armenpress on December 19[iii] and January 8[iv], which served as responses to Aliyev’s statements.
[i] https://president.az/en/articles/view/67537
[ii] https://president.az/en/articles/view/67871
[iii] https://armenpress.am/hy/article/1207904
[iv] https://shorturl.at/JZi9H
Author: RCSP associate expert Narek Minasyan
