In recent days, the President of Azerbaijan has once again presented an imaginary claim to Armenia regarding the “right to return” to so-called “Western Azerbaijan.” It must be noted that Aliyev’s approach to this issue does not represent an isolated or fringe stance within Azerbaijan. On the contrary, there is a broad national consensus around it. The public organization named the “Western Azerbaijan Community” is exceedingly active, enjoys state support in all its initiatives, and is frequently cited by various officials, experts, and journalists in their speeches and analyses.
Armenia’s responses have consistently been firm. The statement by the Prime Minister of Armenia—that the territory beyond Armenia’s eastern border could, in that case, be considered “Eastern Azerbaijan”—is echoed by other officials whenever the occasion arises. The most recent example was the counterstatement by the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia in response to Aliyev’s latest remarks. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan seems largely indifferent to Armenia’s reactions.
Ultimately, one might ask: Why do Aliyev and Azerbaijan find it necessary to speak about a mythical population with a supposedly legal right to return to Armenia—a population that does not, in fact, exist? The reason lies in the fact that, despite its theoretical lack of value or future prospects, this discourse serves to practically address several pressing issues for Aliyev.
The primary objective is to create a false equivalence between the so-called “individuals displaced from Western Azerbaijan in the 1990s” and the Armenians of Artsakh who were subjected to ethnic cleansing. By doing so, Aliyev aims to preempt and discredit any effort by Armenia or other countries to raise the issue of the rights of Artsakh Armenians, by equating their situation with that of “Azerbaijani refugees.”
Another goal is to maintain continuous pressure on Armenia, to influence its internal political dynamics, and to generate public anxiety. Azerbaijan seeks to prevent Armenia from regaining its footing by employing all methods that have emotional impact on Armenian society.
A further aim is to impede any potential peace process. Just like the demand for constitutional amendments, the rhetoric about the “right of return” for so-called “Western Azerbaijanis” is meant to cultivate a perception within the international community that deep and fundamental contradictions exist—thus allowing Aliyev to justify his unwillingness to reach any agreements.
Finally, Aliyev also faces critical domestic political challenges, foremost among them the possibility of transferring power to his son. To distract Azerbaijani society from such internal matters, and to rally public unity around external threats, the “Western Azerbaijan” narrative is among the most effective tools at his disposal.
Regardless of its underlying objectives, the “Western Azerbaijan” discourse poses a significant threat to the statehood of the Republic of Armenia. This means that it is essential to consistently refute the false narratives being advanced and to prevent Azerbaijani authorities from turning the issue into a subject of political bargaining. It would be desirable if, as a mirror response, Armenian society could demonstrate national unity on this matter. Neutralizing threats to statehood is not solely the responsibility of the authorities, but a duty shared by all actors in the public and political sphere—as well as by every single citizen.
Robert Ghevondyan
