Abstract
Armenia is expected to host a meeting of the biannual European Political Community (EPC) in Spring 2026. It will be the eighth meeting held since its opening meeting on 06.10.2022 in Prague. This summit will be of increased importance to Armenia, as the EPC has already facilitated high-level dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This memo will outline the history of the EPC, how EPC summits have affected Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and how hosting the summit next year may impact Armenia’s foreign policy influence in the short-to-medium term.
Introduction
The EPC was the idea of French President Emmanuel Macron, who called for the creation of a European Political Community with the aim of offering ‘a platform for political cooperation for European countries across the continent’.[i] This idea builds on the earlier proposals by Macron’s predecessor Francois Mitterand ‘European Confederation’ in 1989, which floundered due to objections to the proposed inclusion of Russia.[ii] Having received support from both former Council President Charles Michel and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen,[iii] the EPC held its first summit in Prague in October 2022. The EPC offers Armenia a number of practical benefits: firstly, it offers a guaranteed biannual meeting with not only EU member states but also the EU institutions including the Council and Commission. This is critical for Armenia as its parliament approved a bill to start the process of integrating Armenia with the EU. Furthermore, the EPC allows Armenia to engage in direct talks with both Türkiye and Azerbaijan, which have already led to some concrete results. Finally, it allows Armenia to initiate dialogue with other non-EU countries and further cooperation in matters of regional integration and economic development.
Impact of EPC Summits on Armenia-Azerbaijan Dialogue and Armenia-EU relations
Armenia has attended all six EPC summits, the latest of which was held in Tirana in May 2025. There have been three main tangible results arising from EU-Armenia and Armenia-Azerbaijan dialogue during these summits:
The most consequential result was the establishment of the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA). Originally conceived as a two-month mandate, this mandate has been renewed until the year 2027.[iv] Observers from EUMA patrol the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, taking note of incidents and ensuring there is peace in border towns. This mandate negotiated during the EPC summit benefits Armenia in a couple of key ways: firstly, it legitimises the EU’s presence in Armenia, increasing the interest the EU takes in Armenian affairs. Secondly, the Armenians can rely on these independent monitors to confirm to the international community news of breaches of the ceasefire agreement made by Azerbaijan in Armenia’s southern regions.
Another important consequence has been the facilitation of high-level dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Face-to-face meetings between Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev have taken place on the sidelines of different EPC summits, which provide the two leaders a chance to engage in direct dialogue in matters of interest to both countries. While the EPC is not the only format that Aliyev and Pashinyan have had the chance to engage in a direct exchange of views, it is the only regular forum outside of the UN General Assembly that has many other heads of government or state close at hand to act as mediators or to provide their opinions to both sides.
A third significant outcome of Armenia’s participation in the EPC was the announcement during the summit in Grenada in October 2023 that there would be a joint EU-US Summit on the issue of Armenia. This joint EU-US summit facilitated dialogue between Armenia and Western states and underscored the support by both the EU and US for Armenia’s processes of democratisation. Furthermore, there were concrete pledges of financial support by both the EU and US to help grow the Armenian economy with a particular focus on investment in the energy sector.[v] Finally, the Grenada summit resulted in a €15 million commitment by the EU to reallocate funds towards budget support and a further €10.45 million in humanitarian aid in the wake of the Nagorno-Karabakh refugee crisis.[vi]
Potential Impacts of Armenia as Host Nation of 2026 EPC Summit
Armenia’s status as host nation provides opportunities and risks, particularly in its relations between the EU, Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
Opportunity 1: Hosting the EPC provides Armenia with the chance to set the agenda and put forward Armenian concerns regarding the state of play vis-à-vis Azerbaijan and Türkiye. Armenia has a chance to continue direct high-level negotiations with both Türkiye and Azerbaijan to de-escalate tensions and place political pressure on Azerbaijan to sign the peace agreement. Armenia should also make an effort to hold dialogues with the Weimar+ European security triangle of the UK, France, Germany and Poland in order to impress upon them the importance of securing a lasting peace agreement with Azerbaijan and to open negotiations for further military aid in the event of further Azerbaijani stalling. Preparatory work should include exchanges between experts from the Armenian government and the EU institutions (particularly the Commission and Council) to better align their negotiating positions ahead of the EPC summit.
Opportunity 2: As host nation, Armenia has the opportunity to deepen its ties not just with the EU but also Western-aligned non-EU member states such as the UK and Switzerland. Armenia could gain much from initiating dialogue with the Western Balkan states that are also seeking EU membership. Part of this dialogue could include announcing Armenia’s intention of seeking membership in the Common Regional Market, which currently has six member states located in the Western Balkans. While membership of the Common Regional Market would likely see limited economic benefits for Armenia given its more isolated geographical position, it could facilitate simplified travel exchanges between Armenia and the Western Balkan states. It would be an important intermediate step that would allow Armenia to make institutional adjustments that are more in line with the Copenhagen Criteria set out by the European Commission and to diversify its trading networks away from the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Moreover, it would signal to Brussels the seriousness of Armenia’s intent to integrate further in the European sphere and launch its process for EU membership.
Risk 1: There is a risk that Azerbaijan would attempt to derail the EPC summit. As Azerbaijan is already scheduled to host a later EPC summit in Spring 2028,[vii] its government may feel it is unnecessary to attend the one hosted by Armenia. This could put pressure on Türkiye not to attend, which would complicate efforts to secure bilateral agreement with Türkiye on opening border crossings and lifting the economic blockade on Armenia. Alternatively, Azerbaijan could choose to adopt an aggressive posture prior to the summit, continuing or escalating tensions and seeking to play the victim in front of the western countries in order to extract more concessions from the Armenian side ahead of signing the peace agreement.
Risk 2: Russia could escalate rhetoric around Armenia, perhaps going so far as to accuse Armenia of betraying its relationship with its primary security and economic partner. They could leverage their control over the Russian-friendly opposition and media networks in Armenia to disrupt the proceedings of the EPC summit and/or pressure the Pashinyan government not to make any significant announcements regarding further European integration or towards normalisation of relations with Ankara or Baku.
Conclusion
Hosting the EPC summit in spring 2026 represents a great honour and a greater opportunity for Armenia to showcase itself on the political map of Europe, but it also presents real risks that must be managed carefully. Armenian lawmakers need to recognise the great benefits that hosting the EPC can bring, if they are clear about their priorities going into negotiations and are willing to think outside the box to cooperate with both EU and non-EU states. Attending the EPC summits has yielded tangible results for Armenia that would be more difficult to attain in other multilateral formats, and it is entirely within Armenia’s grasp to gain more tangible results if significant preparation and political capital is invested in the summit.
Analysis written by Conor Scannell, Intern Research Associate at Research Center on Security Policy
Conor Scannell
[i] French Presidency of the Council of the European Union (2022) Conclusions of European Council, 23 and 24 June 2022, available:
[ii] Mazur, S.K. (2023) ‘Evolution of the European Political Community in Times of the EU’s ‘Geopolitical Awakening’, Croatian Yearbook of European Law & Policy, 19(1), 79–104, available: https://doi.org/10.3935/cyelp.19.2023.524.
[iii] Stanicek, B. (2022) ‘Beyond Enlargement’: European Political Community and enlargement policy reform, European Parliamentary Research Service, available: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/739209/EPRS_ATA(2022)739209_EN.pdf
[iv] EU Mission in Armenia (2025) About European Union Mission in Armenia, available: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/euma/about-european-union-mission-armenia_en?s=410283
[v] Górecki, W. (2024) Armenia: Between the West and the threat of war, Centre for Eastern Studies, available։ https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-04-10/armenia-between-west-and-threat-war
[vi] Commission (2023) Joint Statement by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, 5 October 2023, available: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-european-commission-president-ursula-von-der-leyen-and-armenian-prime-minister-nikol-2023-10-06_en
[vii] Costa, A. (@eucopresident) (2025) After a very successful Summit in Tirana, the European Political Community will meet again in Copenhagen in October 2025. The EPC has become an essential forum for pan-European political dialogue at Leaders’ level. I thank the next hosts for taking it forward! * 2026: Armenia / Ireland * 2027: Switzerland / Greece * 2028: Azerbaijan / Latvia [X], 23 May 14:23, available: https://x.com/eucopresident/status/1925905325216944386
