Introduction
Corridors occupy a unique place in international relations, embodying the intersection of customs administration, territorial complexity, and security dynamics. Studying how corridors function worldwide provides practical insights to often discussed topics in Armenia. This is why there will be a comparative analysis of four different corridors: the Suwalki Gap separating Kaliningrad and Belarus, the Tin Bigha corridor officially leased to Bangladesh and administered by India, the towns of Baale-Hertog and Baarle-Nassau which fall under joint Belgian and Dutch administration, and finally the German exclave of Büsingen am Hochrhein lying within Switzerland.
Security issues
Treaty and law security, base of secure and viable movement
The first guarantee of security lies in the agreements signed. The ratified text must be clear and precise in order to avoid any misunderstandings. On this subject, the 4 corridors have different approaches.
Baarle, divided between the Netherlands and Belgium, has its customs under European law with the Schengen Agreement. Regarding police forces for the border, Baarle-Hertog and Baarle-Nassau have created a joint council ruling all decisions affecting both towns called the Common Organ in 1998. This legal body is enforcing fair management of the border with representatives from the two towns. It ensures legal security and viable borders.
Büsingen am Hochrhein is in a similar situation with a very detailed treaty signed in 1964 and still active. The cordial relations and the lack of strategic importance help these two corridors to be implemented without too many difficulties.
The same can’t be said for the Suwalki Gap that is of strategic importance. The Suwalki Gap is known for being a vital link between Russia (through Belarus) and Kaliningrad but also a possible threat for eastern NATO members. It’s why the multiple treaties signed in 2002 and 2003 (which have since also had been amended multiple times since 2022) were always the result of difficult negotiations with many great regional powers involved (France, Germany, the EU…). The more precise the final document, the fewer problems there will be in its implementation. This is especially true in this situation, where Lithuania and Russia are not allies and have multiple potential conflicts. Its why implementations are closely monitored. The signature itself is not enough to ensure that agreements will be respected; there needs to be a viable legal enforcement of the treaty. This also allows minor issues to be addressed as per the arrangements made in advance.
Finally, the Tin Bigha Corridor is a prime example of a non-respected treaty even though the corridor exists in spirit. The treaty was signed in 1974, the corridor was implemented in 1992 and is still not following what was agreed on. Tin Bigha is supposed to be leased to and governed by Bangladesh for one symbolic taka (Bangladeshi currency) but it is currently managed by Indian forces. The corridor was supposed to be open twenty-four hours a day, but until 2011, it was six hours, twelve hours and finally the whole day almost twenty years after. It shows that a signed treaty still needs to be followed by concrete changes.
These four corridors demonstrate that signing a treaty is not enough to create a functional transnational corridor. A treaty must be backed up by viable legal enforcement in order to ensure compliance with all aspects. This is particularly the case when the legal basis is weak, the strategic importance of the corridor is high for the stakeholders, or the relationships between the countries involved are conflictual. Two countries negotiating a customs and security treaty for a common corridor need to have a clear understanding of the policing and judicial duties expected of each side to ensure the smooth operation of the corridor. A viable corridor needs a solid legal basis with assurances for all parties so as not to create a lasting situation of non-compliance with the treaty.
Transit security, the importance of knowing who is the enforcer
A successful corridor is a secure one regarding goods and people. These four examples are divided into two different categories, each trying to ensure security in the corridor. The most important question when a corridor of strategic importance is created is to know who will deploy police forces. Having control of the corridor allows it to be blocked if needed, so it becomes a crucial question. The Tin Bigha Corridor is the prime example of this. It is guarded by the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) and they can close it at will. Even though the founding treaty established a virtual twenty-four hours a day opening, BSF can manage the true organization of the corridor without referring to Bangladeshi administration. So BSF can enforce any rule that they want and are only bound by their understanding of a vague treaty. Bangladesh protested multiple times but without success. This example shows the strategic importance of knowing who is enforcing the founding agreement. Security for the Suwalki Gap is provided by Lithuanian police forces, as the corridor crosses their territory, and the corridor is closely monitored by NATO forces. Police forces can check the content of any trucks or trains going through. Lithuania can preserve its sovereignty and ensure its global security from a possible threat coming from Kaliningrad. After the start of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, Lithuania restricted transit for sanctioned goods or dual-use material. Only its position as the sole security enforcer allowed it. These two corridors share a common strategic importance for the countries concerned. India and Lithuania, which own the territory where the corridor is implemented, have the responsibility of transit security in their own interest.
Another solution for transit security is highlighted by the other two corridors. Baarle and Büsingen am Hochrhein use local police forces having the right to cross the border without difficulties, even though it is framed by law. In Baarle, it’s even easier with a joint local police force framed by the Common Organ. More precisely, it encompasses police personnel from both countries and a police station. They can operate freely across the border, in a larger European legal system used to this kind of international cooperation.
These examples show that transit security is an important question that needs to be addressed first in the founding agreement. It needs to be made explicit that security can only be provided through sovereignty except in cases described in the treaty where sovereignty has been given up by both parties for the sake of regional integration e.g. Baarle. In all cases, the country owning the corridor enforced security measures to protect its sovereignty and its territorial integrity. However, it can also serve as a means of gaining power in a geopolitical relation using border control. A second lesson to be learned is how, again, cordial relations help build a lasting and secure corridor. Local cooperation is a result of a geopolitical question resolved by considering how populations already interact with each other before the implementation of the corridor.
Security issues resolved or not because a corridor exists
A corridor concentrates international interactions that happened across the border before. It creates a legal platform to exchange and transit goods and people. In international relations, a corridor is a prime example of a borderisation process and sometimes also border militarisation. That’s the case for the Tin Bigha Corridor and the Suwalki Gap. The first one shows that the Indian BSF started to reinforce their border with the whole enclave after the creation of the corridor. Before its implementation, Dahagram-Angarpota inhabitants could freely cross the virtual border and sell their cattle in the neighbouring Indian market. Since 1992, it has been more and more difficult. Now multiple watch towers and armed guards prevent Bangladeshi people from crossing without going through the only existing corridor. In theory, it was supposed to serve as a link to mainland Bangladesh, but it has also become the only crossing point to India. For the Suwalki Gap, because of complicated relations between Russia and Lithuania and the strategic importance of what is considered as the Achilles heel of NATO in Eastern Europe, the border has always been watched closely by both countries. The corridor didn’t change this situation but has become a new strategic point to consider.
Contrary to these borderisation processes, the situation in Baarle shows no incentives to protect the border except for some patrol by local police forces to enforce specific rules. In Belgium, it’s legal to sell and own fireworks, but not in the Netherlands, so it is a commonly smuggled item. The Schengen Area neutralised most of the possible border conflicts. In Büsingen am Hochrhein, the treaty and the extended partnership between Switzerland and Germany render improbable any borderisation.
What we can learn is that a corridor is never benign if it is of strategic importance, again. For example, the Suwalki Gap was a relatively insignificant region from the collapse of the Soviet Union until Russia began to reorganize its military and adopt a more aggressive posture towards its neighbors in the mid-2000s. Then, NATO countries started to reinforce their military forces in response. By contrast, neither Switzerland or Germany have had any cause to build up their respective militaries on the border and neither side pose a realistic threat to the other, which means the treaty negotiated between them on the status of Büsingen in 1964 has never been significantly altered from its original form.
Customs Arrangements
The customs arrangements for Baale-Hertog and Baarle-Nassau are the simplest to explain because the two states that run them (Belgium and the Netherlands) are both members of the European Union and Schengen Area. Practically speaking, there are no special arrangements in these areas that don’t already apply to the rest of Belgium or the Netherlands.
In the case of Tin Bigha, there is little known in the way of concrete information about customs arrangements. The corridor itself is policed by the Indian Border Security Force (despite the land being leased to Bangladesh) and people are allowed to cross from the enclave of Dahagram-Angarpota to Bangladesh proper. The treaty states that all goods and people (including military personnel) can transit through the corridor without needing the BSF’s express permission. The main customs concern is over cattle, with restrictions being put into place limiting the number of cattle from the enclave to Indian territory that can be sold at market to Indian customers.
By comparison, there are more comprehensive agreements for both the Suwalki Gap and Büsingen which can be analysed further. The original customs arrangements signed by Lithuania and the Russian Federation in 2002 settled a decade-long dispute as to how involved the Russian government was going to be in internal Lithuanian affairs. The European Commission was heavily involved in these negotiations, as the integrity of borders and the Single Market was crucial to Lithuania being accepted into the EU. In the transit agreement signed in 2003 between Lithuania and Russia, passengers needed to obtain a Facilitated Transit Document (FTD) for car travel or the Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD). Most Kaliningrad residents opted for either the FRTD or a Lithuanian visa (which allowed them to disembark the train and travel elsewhere in Lithuania) while mainland Russian citizens tended to travel with the FTD. According to the 1993 trade agreement between the two countries which formed the basis for the later transit agreement, each state was to receive ‘most favoured nation status’ which facilitated easier customs procedures. Trucks and trains travelling to and from Kaliningrad Oblast were sealed and were subject to occasional inspections, which focused mainly on checking whether the courier had the correct paperwork. Lithuania adopted the TIR electronic pre-declaration system in 2024, which increased the efficiency of customs procedures.
The current transit arrangements have been subject to partial modifications in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Currently, there are no more than three hundred holders of the FRTD who are permitted to be on the train during the journey. The train was not sealed for a long time; it was possible for travelers carrying EU residence permits to simply get off the train during a technical inspection in the village of Kena. This changed in 2023 and 2024, where it is no longer possible for transit passengers to legally disembark the train anywhere onto Lithuanian territory. This has now created a situation where Russian citizens are starting to enter Lithuania by extralegal means; just recently, a Russian man jumped out of the train about twenty minutes away from the border with Kaliningrad and went on the run.
The customs arrangement between the Swiss Confederation and the Federal Republic (West) Germany was signed in 1964, where unlike the agreement between Lithuania and Russia, it was agreed with practically no major modifications since the signing. There are a total of forty-four articles in the treaty dealing with security, justice and customs arrangements.
It was agreed that Büsingen would be treated as part of the Swiss economic area, with the Swiss Franc being the dominant currency used in everyday life. Büsingen is one of only two German territories that are not part of the EU customs union, instead forming part of the customs territory of the Swiss Confederation.[i] Legally speaking, Büsingen is treated as being a part of the Swiss canton of Schaffhausen[ii] which means there are a long list of imports that come under Swiss legal jurisdiction, such as fertilizer, medicines, and even corpses.[iii]
When it comes to the enforcement of Swiss customs law, a Swiss customs official may call in their German counterpart as a witness in the event an item is being seized from somebody transiting without their consent.[iv] Additionally, there are certain goods that are not subject to Swiss customs taxes, such as learning materials for schools and any other goods that are deemed necessary for the administration in Büsingen.[v]
There are a number of lessons that can be learned from the customs arrangements in each of these four cases. The first and most important one is just like in security it helps to have a very comprehensive and detailed written agreement, which is the case for every case except Tin Bigha. The more detail that there is in the customs arrangement, the better it will be for both parties. Except for Tin Bigha, each corridor had some version of a simplified customs arrangement to more easily facilitate the movement of goods and people. These detailed arrangements are not just the product of cordial relations between two states or a group of states like in the case of Baarle or Büsingen: the atmosphere of mutual distrust between Lithuania and Russia also produced a comprehensive agreement that has been progressively amended unilaterally in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Another lesson is the importance of being able to negotiate in good faith. The customs status of the two most successful cases (Baarle and Büsingen) were each negotiated by either two like-minded democracies or a group of like-minded democracies. Higher levels of mutual trust have meant that unlike in the cases of the Suwalki Gap or Tin Bigha, the agreements have been longer-lasting (in fact, there are currently no signs they will be amended anytime soon) and have resulted in a virtually seamless border existence (in the sense that a hard border does not really exist). This is the best outcome for the people depending on these corridors, where an accident of geography does not adversely impact their lives.
Conclusion
After examining the four different situations from our two focal points, security and customs, some settings help to create a lasting, viable and secure corridor. First, states need to negotiate on a mutual trust basis. Only then can they create a treaty that encompasses all aspects of the coming corridor in a very detailed manner to diminish possible areas of conflict. Secondly, this agreement needs to respect the sovereignty of both countries but especially the one where the corridor is located. This will help to create lasting security. Finally, all other problems will more easily be addressed like passport controls, policing duties etc., if the common narrative is not one on a winner-loser basis but on a win-win agreement. So, having cordial relations between states based on mutual trust is the first step so an amicable conclusion to a geopolitical puzzle is reached.
Article written by Emilien Renard and Conor Scannell, Interns and Research Associates at the Research Center on Security Policy
[i] Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Swiss Confederation 1964, Article 4. Paragraph 1
[ii] Ibid., Article 2, Paragraph 2
[iii] Ibid., Article 2, Paragraph 1
[iv] Ibid., Article 4
[v] Ibid., Article 5
