Distancing from Russia in the Context of Armenia’s Policy of Strategic Balancing

Preface

In recent years, Armenia’s foreign policy has undergone profound changes. These developments are driven by a range of factors, including a new regional status quo, a crisis of trust in traditional allies, the emergence of new partners, and shifts in public sentiment. While Armenia’s foreign policy direction was once clearly oriented toward close cooperation with Russia, today its relationship with Moscow is undergoing a strategic reassessment.

This article outlines the recent dynamics in Armenia-Russia relations, the causes and consequences of key developments, and how these relations are being reinterpreted from the Armenian perspective.

The Crisis of Trust in Armenia–Russia Relations

Since the 2018 revolution in Armenia, issues related to mutual trust have periodically surfaced in Armenian-Russian relations. Examples include targeted campaigns against members of Armenia’s new government by Russian state-aligned media and pro-Russian circles.[i] In turn, Armenia made repeated efforts to demonstrate its commitment to the alliance with Russia — one such gesture being the 2019 decision to send a humanitarian group of Armenian deminers, medics, and security personnel to Syria at the request of the Russian side.[ii]

Tensions in bilateral relations escalated further following the 44-day war of 2020. Although the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between Armenia and Russia did not extend security guarantees to Nagorno-Karabakh, there was a widespread expectation among the Armenian public and political elites that Russia, as an ally and OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair, would intervene to halt the war. This did not occur, and the signing of the trilateral statement on November 9, 2020, was met with widespread dissatisfaction.

In 2021–22, Azerbaijani forces invaded Armenia’s sovereign territory, occupying approximately 200 km² in the Gegharkunik, Syunik, and Vayots Dzor regions. In response to these attacks, Armenia appealed to the CSTO in May 2021,[iii] to Russia in November 2021,[iv] and again to both Russia and the CSTO in September 2022[v], expecting its allies to fulfill their obligations. However, the CSTO and Russia failed to respond adequately to these violations of Armenia’s territorial integrity and did not issue clear assessments condemning Azerbaijan’s aggression. At the same time, widespread reports emerged about the ineffectiveness of Russian border guards in certain sectors along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border[vi], as well as about the failure of the joint Armenian-Russian air defense system to operate during attacks.[vii]

From late 2022 onward, the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, various security incidents, and the lack of effective response by Russian peacekeepers — along with reports of corruption involving them — sparked growing concern and discontent among the Armenian public.[viii] In September 2023, Azerbaijan’s ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh and the inaction of Russian peacekeepers became a new source of disappointment and public outrage.[ix]

It is also noteworthy that Armenian-Russian military-technical cooperation has significantly deteriorated. Due to the large-scale war in Ukraine, Russia was unable to fulfill arms contracts with Armenia, despite receiving $400 million in payments from the Armenian side.[x]Since January 2021, Russia’s share in Armenia’s arms procurement has declined from a previous 96% to just 10% in 2024.[xi]

In response to increasing public and political dissatisfaction in Armenia, Russian state media repeatedly launched information campaigns aimed at shifting the blame for its inaction or inefficiency onto the Armenian side.[xii]

This series of developments could be continued further. They have had a detrimental impact on both the strategic alliance between Armenia and Russia and on the atmosphere of mutual trust.

In public discourse, the term “betrayal” is being used with growing frequency when discussing these issues.

According to surveys conducted by the International Republican Institute, positive perceptions of relations with Russia in Armenia have declined by more than half since 2019 — dropping from 93% to 43% — while negative perceptions have increased almost ninefold, rising from 6% to 55%.

Notably, according to the results published in July 2025, 45% of Armenians view Russia as a political partner, 27% as a political threat, and 27% as a security partner. In terms of perceived partnerships, Russia now ranks behind both Iran and France.[xiii]

Maintaining Distance from Russia

Russia’s actions against Armenia’s national interests and the shift in public perceptions have led Yerevan to reassess its bilateral relations with Moscow. The ongoing war in Ukraine has significantly accelerated this process, as Russia’s resources and political attention became absorbed by the conflict, thereby expanding the room for maneuver for Armenia and other neighboring countries.

Within this framework, over the past four years, Armenia has taken a series of steps that would have been hard to imagine earlier. At the beginning of 2024, the Armenian government “froze” its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), led by Russia, halted membership fee payments[xiv], withdrew from military exercises, left CSTO-secretariat posts allocated to Armenia vacant, and ceased high-level participation in the organization’s statutory bodies. Nevertheless, Armenia has refrained from formally withdrawing, weighing the potential risks of such a move. At the same time, official Yerevan has repeatedly declared that the point of no return in CSTO relations has been crossed.[xv]

Changes have also emerged in Armenia’s voting behavior at the United Nations. On several sensitive issues for Moscow, Armenia has shifted from consistent support to abstentions and, in some cases, outright votes against Russian interests[xvi].

Armenia has also begun to respond to anti-Armenian campaigns within Russian media. In the spring of 2024, the country’s Television and Radio Broadcasting Network suspended the broadcast of “Evening with Vladimir Solovyov” and “Sunday Evening with Vladimir Solovyov” — two Kremlin-aligned programs — on the “Planeta” channel, transmitted via public multiplex[xvii]. The possibility of banning all Russian state channels from Armenia’s public multiplex has been under ongoing discussion[xviii]. In recent years, Armenia has also barred entry to several Russian political and public figures involved in anti-Armenian propaganda campaigns[xix].

In 2024, at Armenia’s request, Russia began gradually withdrawing its border guards from parts of Armenia’s frontiers — first along the Azerbaijani border, and then from Zvartnots International Airport in Yerevan. As of January 1, 2025, Armenia’s National Security Service (NSS) Border Troops have assumed responsibility for portions of the Armenia–Iran and Armenia–Turkey borders. The checkpoint along the Armenia–Iran border is now operated exclusively by Armenian NSS personnel[xx].

This policy of distancing from Russia has provoked polarized reactions in Armenia. Pro-Russian circles label the government’s actions as “betrayal,” while pro-Western voices hail them as a foreign policy pivot. Armenian authorities, however, maintain that they are not building relations with any one country at the expense of another[xxi]. Yerevan has declared a balanced and balancing foreign policy aimed at fostering ties with all global power centers and regional actors. According to the government, this does not imply a reformatting, deterioration, or severing of relations with Russia[xxii]. The strategic aim is to gradually reduce Armenia’s external dependencies while carefully calculating, minimizing, and managing associated risks.

No Armenian government — regardless of its foreign policy orientation — can ignore the country’s geographic and geopolitical constraints.

For instance, closed borders continue to hinder efforts to meaningfully reduce Armenia’s trade and energy dependence on Russia. This may explain the Armenian government’s caution on particularly sensitive matters for Moscow, such as the Russian 102nd military base in Gyumri or the formal suspension of CSTO membership. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s participation in the May 9, 2025 Victory Day celebration in Moscow should be viewed within this same logic[xxiii].

Conclusion

In conclusion, Armenia’s political drift away from Russia reflects more than just governmental decisions; it signals a broader societal shift. Armenia-Russia relations are unlikely to return to their pre-2020 state. Russia is no longer seen as a reliable partner — especially in the security domain. Moreover, Moscow’s regional priorities have shifted, with Azerbaijan gaining strategic significance due to deepening cooperation in energy and logistics. That said, Moscow is unlikely to passively accept its waning influence in Armenia. Recent changes within Russia’s ruling elite suggest that the Kremlin intends to pursue a more assertive policy — particularly in light of Armenia’s upcoming 2026 parliamentary elections[xxiv].

Narek Minasyan

[i] https://archive.yerevan.today/all/society/28589/sorosy-hayastanum-tverov-u-anunnerov

[ii] https://www.azatutyun.am/a/29758510.html

[iii] https://www.primeminister.am/hy/press-release/item/2021/05/14/Nikol-Pashinyan-CSTO/

[iv] https://shorturl.at/4RPjV

[v] https://armenpress.am/hy/article/1092295

[vi] https://factor.am/554091.html

[vii] https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32912819.html

[viii] https://fip.am/25234

[ix] https://armenpress.am/hy/article/1119933

[x] https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32712887.html

[xi] https://www.aysor.am/am/news/2024/03/02/%D4%B1%D4%BD%D5%94/2237421