Articles and analysis

Azerbaijan–Russia Relations Since 1991: Political, Economic, and Security Dimensions

by RCSP
by RCSP

Introduction

Since independence in 1991, Azerbaijan has managed relations with Russia through a disciplined blend of accommodation and autonomy. The asymmetry is obvious: Russia is an important power with deep legacy ties while Azerbaijan is a mid-sized state whose prosperity and sovereignty depend on diversified partners and unimpeded energy exports. The bilateral portfolio spans politics (alignment, hedging, and narrative management), economics (trade structure, investment, energy routes, and connectivity), and security (conflict management, arms, peacekeeping, and mediation). The strategic problem has been to extract cooperation without sliding into dependency, especially during moments when Russian leverage is highest during war scares, price shocks, or institutional pressure.

This report surveys three dimensions (political, economic, and security) then lists the main memberships and treaties chronologically and closes with scenarios for 2025–2030. The through-line is consistent: Baku seeks flexibility. When Russian involvement helps stabilise crises or unlocks deals, Azerbaijan engages; when it threatens autonomy, Azerbaijan counters by tightening the alliance with Turkey, expanding links to the EU, and broadening logistics routes that reduce single-point dependence.

Political relations

1991–1993: instability and a reset

Early leadership oscillated between reliance on Moscow and distancing. Ayaz Mutalibov leaned on Russia amid the Karabakh war, while Abulfaz Elchibey, the first and only democratically elected President in post-Soviet Azerbaijan, attempted a decisive pivot toward Turkey, rejected deeper post-Soviet integration, and ended Russian basing. Military setbacks, internal turmoil, and friction with Moscow culminated in Elchibey’s ouster and Heydar Aliyev’s ascension to the presidency in 1993 [1].

1993–2003: Aliyev’s balancing doctrine

Heydar Aliyev embedded a “multi-vector” approach. He mended ties with Moscow (CIS entry; a 1997 friendship treaty) while placing the country’s strategic bets westward. The cornerstone was “pipeline diplomacy,” which meant to invite Russian commercial participation at the margin, but route core oil and gas exports through Georgia and Turkey, reducing Russian transit leverage. Politically, Aliyev widened the Karabakh mediation to include the United States and France alongside Russia, diluting sole stewardship. He kept formal politeness with Moscow yet refused deeper military alignment, while not renewing its participation in the CIS Collective Security Treaty in 1999 [1].

2003–2013: consolidation under Ilham Aliyev

The BTC oil pipeline (2006) and South Caucasus gas pipeline (2007) entrenched export autonomy. Azerbaijan engaged NATO via Partnership for Peace and cooperation plans, but stopped short of alliance ambitions. The 2008 Russia–Georgia war was a shock to regional assumptions. It confirmed Russian willingness to use force in the neighbourhood, nudging Baku to hedge more carefully in rhetoric and personnel while continuing its Western-leaning energy strategy [1].

2014–2019: managing the Russia–West rupture

After Crimea, Azerbaijan stayed non-aligned: it upheld territorial integrity as a principle but did not join sanctions. Domestically, the government grew more sceptical of Western democracy promotion, echoing some Russian narratives without surrendering its policy autonomy [1]. Russian cultural and educational links expanded, for instance there are hundreds of Russian-language schools in Azerbaijan and a Baku branch of Moscow State University [2]. The diaspora and labour migration channels continued to shape perceptions and business ties [1]. The net effect was pragmatic: cordial relations with Moscow, strategic diversification elsewhere.

2020–2024: a decisive phase

Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War reshaped leverage. The 9 November 2020 trilateral statement introduced a Russian peacekeeping presence on Azerbaijani territory with a five-year horizon [4]. Baku treated this as temporary [4] and reinforced its alliance with Turkey, including deeper military interoperability [5] [6]. In February 2022, a declaration on “allied interaction” with Russia reassured Moscow without creating defence obligations [2] [7]. In September 2023 Azerbaijan restored full control over Karabakh. Russian peacekeepers subsequently withdrew early in 2024 [4].  After brokering the 9 November 2020 ceasefire and deploying peacekeepers, Russia saw its on-the-ground leverage diminish when those forces withdrew in April 2024 [8]. The EU meanwhile inserted itself by launching a civilian monitoring mission in Armenia (EUMA) to support border stability and the normalisation process [9]. The United States has also convened high-level talks—most visibly the May 2023 Washington ministerial at which Secretary Blinken reported ‘tangible progress’—making mediation influence genuinely contested [10].

Public opinion and diaspora dynamics

Independent polling is limited, but approval of Russia fell sharply after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine [3]. Pragmatic attitudes endure because of trade, remittances, and large communities of Azerbaijanis living or doing business in Russia [1]. That ballast is meaningful but not determinative of high policy.

Third-party influences

Turkey is the single most consequential external actor. The Shusha Declaration (2021) formalised allied relations and reinforced deterrence, limiting Russia’s margin for coercion [5] [6]. EU involvement since 2020, in mediation and energy cooperation, adds economic and diplomatic options, culminating in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in July 2022 to double natural gas exports to Europe by 2027, aiding Europe’s effort to replace Russian gas [11] [12]. Iran remains a periodic source of tension and risk, which indirectly sustains the logic of retaining a functional channel with Moscow while deepening ties with Ankara.

Economic ties

Trade structure and investment

Russia has long been a top trading partner by turnover and typically Azerbaijan’s largest import supplier [2]. Imports from Russia include grain, timber, metals, machinery, and consumer goods, creating a structural trade deficit on the bilateral account [2]. Exports to Russia are modest relative to hydrocarbon sales to the EU and Turkey [13] [14]. Hundreds of companies with Russian capital operate in Azerbaijan [2] and tourism and services links are significant [15]. Diaspora businesses and remittances add further interdependence [1].

Energy: Autonomy through corridors

The decisive economic story is pipeline geography. From the late 1990s, Azerbaijan chose non-Russian export routes: Baku–Supsa (1999), BTC (2006), and the Southern Gas Corridor (2007–2020) through Georgia and Turkey into Europe [1]. These projects are locked in autonomy from Russian transit systems [1]. Baku preserved a small northbound oil link and welcomed selective Russian corporate stakes to keep channels open, but the revenue base overwhelmingly depends on westbound flows [12]. Azerbaijan coordinates within OPEC+, often aligning with Russia on output policy, and cooperates pragmatically on Caspian maritime management [16] and grid balancing [17].

Additionally, since 2022, multiple investigations and market reports have alleged that Russian hydrocarbons have been routed via Azerbaijan/Türkiye and re-labelled for export, most visibly State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan’s (SOCAR) STAR refinery processing Russian crude under a $1.5 billion Lukoil supply-and-finance deal, with EU-bound “Russian-origin” fuel cargoes rising in 2024 [18] [19]. Analysts and regional outlets also reported Russian crude entering the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan system from mid-2022, while EU documents and reporting flagged the risk that higher Azerbaijani exports to Europe could be offset by Russian imports for domestic use, potentially amounting to sanctions circumvention [20] [21] [22].

Connectivity: Betting on multiple axes

Azerbaijan positions itself on both the Trans-Caspian “Middle Corridor” to Europe, which offers an alternative to routes through Russia [23], and the North–South Transport Corridor linking Russia to Iran and onward to South Asia [24]. The approach is instrumental: capture logistics rent and goodwill in both directions while ensuring that no single corridor becomes a choke point that others can exploit politically.

Sanctions spillovers and post-2022 adjustments

Sanctions on Russia disrupted payments and logistics [25], but also redirected some Russian demand through neighbouring states, including Azerbaijan [26]. By the first half of 2023, Azerbaijan’s imports from Russia had increased (filling gaps left by embargoed EU goods) [27], and Russian demand for Azerbaijani agricultural exports rose due to Moscow’s ban on many Western foods [28]. Skilled relocations and firm registrations by Russian citizens produced a service-sector bump [29]. Food security risks, especially wheat dependency, prompted diversification toward Kazakhstan and investment in domestic capacity [30].

Security & military

Russia’s dual role

For decades Moscow acted as both broker and armourer in the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict cycle. It mediated ceasefires (1994, 2016) [31] while supplying major arms to both sides [32] [33], preserving a manageable balance that sustained its leverage. Azerbaijan modernised using oil revenues [31], purchasing heavily from Russia when it made sense and increasingly from Israel and Turkey for superior intelligence, surveillance, precision strike, and UAV capabilities [34].

The 2020 war and the Russian presence

Azerbaijan’s forty-four-day campaign in 2020, underpinned by drones and improved command-and-control, recast the military balance. The 9 November statement ended the war and deployed a Russian peacekeeping contingent to Armenian-populated areas and the Lachin corridor [4]. For the first time since independence, Russian troops were stationed on Azerbaijani soil, accepted by Baku as a transitional expedient rather than a new normal.

2023–2024: resolution and withdrawal

In September 2023, citing security incidents and illegal armed formations, Azerbaijan conducted a swift operation that restored full sovereignty over Karabakh. Russian forces did not intervene and soon began an early withdrawal, completed in 2024 [4]. The Russian–Turkish monitoring centre also closed [35]. For Azerbaijan, this was a strategic milestone: a post-Soviet state ended a Russian military presence on its territory peacefully and on its own terms.

Force development and partnerships

After 2020, Azerbaijan accelerated defence industry and doctrinal cooperation with Turkey, moving closer to NATO standards without seeking membership [36]. Russia’s constrained military-industrial capacity after 2022 and Azerbaijan’s performance preferences further reduced Moscow’s share in Baku’s procurement [37]. Intelligence deconfliction and technical maintenance with Russia continue where useful, but basing rights are not on offer [38]. The Gabala radar, leased to Russia in the 2000s, closed in 2012, remains instructive about sovereignty boundaries [39].

Current leverage picture

Azerbaijan counters Russia’s influence by sustaining the Turkish alliance, deepening EU energy relationships, diversifying arms and logistics, and demonstrating resolve to act unilaterally when core interests are at stake. The resulting equilibrium is not sentimental but transactional and anchored in clearly signalled red lines.

Recent flashpoints included Russia’s public pressure on Azerbaijan to reopen the Lachin corridor and Baku’s one-day operation in September 2023, during which several Russian peacekeepers were killed and President Aliyev apologised, exposing frictions over deconfliction and the 2020 ceasefire’s implementation [40] [41]. In 2024–25 the rift widened beyond Karabakh as Russian peacekeepers withdrew and the joint monitoring centre closed, Azerbaijani authorities shuttered Sputnik’s Baku office and detained staff amid a media/diplomatic spat, Baku blamed Russian air defences for downing an Azerbaijan Airlines jet, and Kyiv accused Russia of striking SOCAR sites in Odesa [42] [43] [44].

Memberships & Treaties

  • 1992 – Diplomatic Relations: Formal ties create the post-Soviet baseline for engagement and consular cooperation.

  • 1993 – CIS Accession: Baku joins the CIS, easing tensions with Moscow while pursuing a multi-vector policy.

  • 1994 – NATO Partnership for Peace: Azerbaijan signs PfP; the ceasefire ends the first Karabakh war without foreign peacekeepers in Azerbaijan.

  • 1996 – Baku–Novorossiysk Oil Transit: Early oil flows via Russia maintain a pragmatic energy link as westbound corridors are built.

  • 1997 – Treaty of Friendship: A foundational pact on sovereignty, non-interference, and regular consultations.

  • 1997 – GUAM Formation: Co-founding a non-Russian cooperation bloc signals diversification.

  • 1999 – Exit from CSTO: Non-renewal of the CIS defence treaty affirms non-alignment.

  • 2002 – Caspian Seabed Delimitation: A RU–AZ median-line deal clarifies offshore jurisdiction and reduces legal friction.

  • 2008 – Strategic Partnership Declaration: Presidents reaffirm close ties amid regional tension.

  • 2012 – Gabala Radar Closure: Lease ends; Russia withdraws, underscoring Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over basing.

  • 2018 – Caspian Sea Convention: Five-party rules for navigation, security, and resources shape RU–AZ maritime conduct.

  • 2020 – Trilateral Ceasefire Statement: Ends the Second Karabakh War; Russian peacekeepers deploy on a time-limited mandate.

  • 2021 – Shusha Declaration (Turkey): An allied pact with mutual-assistance clauses shifts the regional security balance.

  • 2022 – Declaration on Allied Interaction: Elevates RU–AZ cooperation without mutual-defence obligations; Baku preserves autonomy.

  • 2024 – Peacekeepers Withdraw: Early exit ends Russia’s military presence; the monitoring centre closes.

Conclusion & Outlook

Azerbaijan has expanded strategic autonomy while maintaining a working relationship with Russia. Energy corridors to the West, the alliance with Turkey, and coercive leverage demonstrated in 2020 and 2023 altered the balance sustainably.

Meanwhile, if Russia reasserts itself by backing Armenian positions that cut across Baku’s red lines, or if Azerbaijan hosts enduring Turkish military facilities, friction could surface, leading to harsher rhetoric, trade irritants, slower border demarcation, and more muscular signalling along lines of contact. However, there have been no publicly accessible Russian positions, decisions, or legal instruments since 2020 that clearly endorse Armenian claims contrary to Azerbaijan’s core red lines. If anything, Russia’s official posture has de-emphasised corridor-style terminology, instead framing discussions about the Zangezur route as a matter of restoring regional connectivity and not endorsing an extraterritorial corridor, suggesting that Moscow is avoiding alignment against Baku’s interests.

Most likely Azerbaijan sustains cordial ties with Russia, maximises Turkish defence integration, and expands EU energy and export relationships, keeping its strategy of “balanced hedging.” Logistics policy remains multi-vector: Middle Corridor upgrades, including the newly instantiated U.S.-brokered Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) linking mainland Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan, are advancing alongside North–South Corridor efficiencies [45] [46].

In all scenarios, one constant is Azerbaijan’s emphasis on sovereignty and flexibility. Baku has learned to navigate Russian relations through a mix of accommodation and assertiveness, a formula likely to continue. As President Aliyev summed up in 2016, Azerbaijan is an independent and sovereign state that will not be dragged into adventures or one-sided dependencies [47]. This independent streak suggests that Azerbaijan will neither join an anti-Russia front nor become a Russian vassal. Instead, it will aim to remain a friend to Moscow but on its own terms, a stance that has thus far served it well in an era of shifting great-power equations. Recent crises, like Russian pressure over Lachin, clashes involving peacekeepers in 2023, the subsequent withdrawal of Russian forces in 2024, and the 2025 diplomatic fallout over the plane downing and media bans, underscore how Baku preserves its autonomy even amid sharp tensions [41] [42] [44].

Sources

«Research Center on Security Policy» Non-governmental organisation

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