Articles and analysis

Uzbekistan-Russia relations since 1991

by RCSP
by RCSP

Introduction

Uzbekistan’s relationship with Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has evolved through phases of strategic partnership, cautious distancing, and pragmatic re-engagement. Over three decades, Tashkent has navigated between reaffirming historical ties with Moscow and asserting an independent foreign policy. Early on, Uzbekistan joined post-Soviet structures and treaties with Russia, laying a foundation for bilateral cooperation. Later, disagreements over security alignments and Uzbekistan’s outreach to other partners led to periods of cool relations. Major turning points, such as the 2005 Andijan crisis and the 2016 leadership transition, triggered shifts in the bilateral dynamic. This report examines Uzbekistan–Russia ties across the political, economic, and security domains from 1991 to 2025, drawing on official documents, expert analyses, and international data. The analysis highlights how Uzbekistan has balanced close ties with Russia against its “multi-vector” diplomacy, aiming to avoid overdependence on any single power [1].

Political Relations

Early Independence and Initial Alignments (1991–1999)

In the 1990s, Uzbekistan’s first president, Islam Karimov, maintained formal goodwill with Moscow while asserting sovereignty. Tashkent signed a 1992 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership with Russia and joined the CIS Collective Security Treaty (CST) that year [2] [3]. By the late 1990s, Karimov grew wary of multilateral blocs and Russian dominance. In 1999, Uzbekistan refused to renew the CST, withdrawing alongside Georgia and Azerbaijan [4]. Tashkent pursued greater autonomy and limited Western partnerships, briefly joining GUAM to diversify options. This shift showed the limits of Uzbekistan’s willingness to subordinate policy to Moscow’s agendas [4].

Post-9/11 Rapprochement and 2005 Pivot

In the early 2000s, Uzbekistan tilted further from Russia by embracing U.S. security cooperation. After September 2001, Karimov allowed U.S. forces to use the Karshi-Khanabad airbase for Afghanistan operations [5]. The 2005 Andijan uprising, Western criticism, and Uzbek isolation ended this phase. Tashkent expelled U.S. forces and turned back to Russia [6]. In November 2005, Putin and Karimov signed a Treaty on Allied Relations with mutual defence provisions and potential Russian base access [7]. Karimov lauded an “unprecedented level” in ties [5]. Uzbekistan withdrew from GUAM by 2005 and in 2006 rejoined the CSTO [1] [8]. The mid-2000s thus saw Uzbekistan return to Russia’s strategic orbit.

Strains and Strategic Distance (2007–2015)

Despite the post-2005 alliance, Tashkent guarded independence. It resisted CSTO reforms, opposing a stronger rapid reaction force [9]. In 2012, Uzbekistan again suspended its CSTO membership after disputes over Moscow’s plans for expanded presence in Central Asia [1]. Meanwhile, Karimov balanced ties with China and cautiously with the West. He refused permanent foreign bases on Uzbek soil, consistent with a 2012 non-alignment doctrine [1]. Tashkent stayed outside the EAEU and similar projects [1]. During Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Uzbekistan remained neutral and outside Moscow’s military bloc [1]. The guiding principle was clear: cooperation with Russia, but under no circumstances at the expense of sovereignty [1].

The Mirziyoyev Era – Renewal with Neutrality (2016–2025)

After Karimov’s death in 2016, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev recalibrated policy. He improved ties with neighbours, China, and the West, while reinvigorating engagement with Russia. Mirziyoyev’s first state visit to Moscow in April 2017 set a pragmatic tone [1]. Joint military exercises increased in frequency and scale [1]. Tashkent still declined to join Moscow-led blocs, remaining outside the CSTO and taking only EAEU observer status [1].

Russia’s 2022 full-scale war against Ukraine tested this balance. Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov stated that Uzbekistan recognizes Ukraine’s sovereignty and does not recognize Russia-backed separatist entities [1] [10]. Tashkent pledged to abide by UN sanctions while limiting spillovers [10]. Uzbekistan maintained careful neutrality and continued cooperation with Russia where interests aligned [1]. Mirziyoyev hosted Putin at the September 2022 SCO summit and signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Declaration [1]. Officials stressed red lines, insisting there are no political conditions attached to energy or other cooperation [11]. Public messaging emphasised mutual cooperation with both countries and called for a “peaceful solution” [10]. This exemplifies Mirziyoyev’s approach: engage Russia deeply in trade, investment and security, yet preserve policy autonomy [3] [10].

Economic Ties

Trade and Investment – Between Dependency and Diversification

Russia has long been a key economic partner, though China has recently challenged its primacy. In the 1990s–2000s, Russia was Uzbekistan’s largest trading partner and a significant investor, notably Lukoil’s 35-year, roughly $1 billion gas development agreement in 2004 [6]. By 2023, China overtook Russia as top trading partner, $13.7 billion to Russia’s $9.9 billion (Russia was slightly ahead in 2022 at $9.39 billion) [2]. Uzbekistan runs a trade deficit with Russia [2], importing energy, machinery, metals, and food, and exporting mainly gold, fertilisers, and some gas [1]. Since 2016, reforms and free economic zones drew Chinese loans and investment that now exceed Russian inflows [1]. In May 2024, during Putin’s visit, a contract was signed for a 330 MW small modular reactor (SMR) nuclear plant, Rosatom’s first export project of this type [1].

Energy Links and Sanctions Spillovers

Uzbekistan periodically faces domestic gas shortages despite exports. It shifted exports to China via new pipelines, reducing interdependence with Russia. In late 2022, Moscow floated a “gas union” with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan [12]. Tashkent responded coolly, insisting any deals be commercial and sovereignty-respecting [11]. In June 2023, Uzbekistan signed a two-year Gazprom contract to import 2.8 bcm annually via Kazakhstan [13]. By October 2023, flows began: Russia supplied up to 9 mcm per day, easing winter shortfalls [14]. Putin framed Russia as a “reliable gas supplier” as Moscow sought new markets and Tashkent addressed its shortages [14]. Beyond hydrocarbons, the nuclear project in Jizzakh foresees six Russian-designed SMR units from 2029 [15].

Western sanctions since 2022 have had mixed effects. Russian traders turned to Uzbekistan to source and trans-ship goods, lifting commerce in machinery and consumer electronics [1]. Data suggested spikes in exports of hard-to-obtain items to Russia. Logistics cooperation expanded, including steps toward the International North–South Transport Corridor to which Uzbekistan applied to join in 2025 [16]. Negative spillovers include ruble swings and recession in 2022, which hit remittances from Uzbek workers in Russia. Remittances comprise 17.8% of GDP [17]. Transfers from Russia surged in 2022, then fell by about 42% in 2023, from $14.7 billion to $8.6 billion [17]. Russian records showed 1.7 million Uzbek migrant workers registered by mid-2023, down from 2.9 million at end-2022, with many shifting to Kazakhstan, Turkey, or elsewhere [17]. Still, Russia employs millions of Uzbeks and provides about three-quarters of remittance inflows [18]. The task ahead is to diversify partners and corridors (e.g., the trans-Caspian “Middle Corridor” via Azerbaijan and Turkey [19]) while preserving mutually beneficial links. Moscow appears intent on a strong foothold via energy, industry, and labour absorption, even as China’s role grows [2].

Security and Military Cooperation

Foundational Security Ties and Breaks

At independence, Uzbekistan inherited a Soviet-trained military and border concerns, inclining it to early cooperation with Moscow. In May 1992, Uzbekistan joined the Collective Security Treaty (CST) with Russia and others, hosting the signing in Tashkent [4]. During the 1992–1997 Tajik civil war, Uzbekistan and Russia supported the Tajik government, reflecting shared stability interests [19]. After refusing to extend the CST in 1999, Tashkent spent years outside Moscow-led alliances, cultivating bilateral ties with the United States and partners like Turkey [3]. By the early 2000s, cooperation with Russia was largely bilateral training and defence-industrial maintenance without alliance commitments [1].

Alliance Treaty and CSTO Re-engagement

After Andijan in 2005, security ties with Russia expanded quickly. The November 2005 Treaty on Allied Relations included a mutual defence clause treating an attack on one as aggression against both [5]. It also allowed potential Russian use of Uzbek military facilities [5]. In 2006, Uzbekistan rejoined the CSTO [4]. Tashkent preserved autonomy by refusing CSTO rapid deployments on its territory and skipping most joint drills [3]. It objected to a CSTO Rapid Reaction Force in 2009 and to new Russian bases in Central Asia [3]. In 2012, Uzbekistan again suspended CSTO membership, arguing the alliance ignored Uzbek views and it subsequently relied on bilateral ties [1] [4].

Bilateral Military Cooperation and Arms Trade

Outside the CSTO, the partnership deepened. A 1994 defence cooperation treaty and a 1999 military-technical accord underpinned Russian support for Soviet-legacy hardware [1]. The joint venture UzRosAvia overhauled helicopters and transport aircraft [1]. In 2014, Russia forgave nearly $1 billion of debt to unlock new arms credits [20]. Moscow also granted CSTO-level discount pricing despite Uzbekistan being outside the bloc [1]. Russia is now the dominant arms supplier, providing over half of imports [21]. Strategic programmes followed: a five-year defence plan in 2017, a 2021 roadmap, and in 2024 a comprehensive programme for 2025–2030 with 50 joint activities scheduled in 2025 [1]. In August 2021, Russian and Uzbek troops held drills at Termez near the Afghan border, simulating cross-border instability responses as the Taliban took power [22]. Uzbekistan’s doctrine bans foreign bases [1], so it invites short-term deployments for exercises and allows limited facility use.

Regional Security Role – Cooperation and Caution

Uzbekistan and Russia cooperate in regional initiatives on Tashkent’s terms. Uzbekistan is an SCO founder and hosts its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure [23]. It coordinates with Moscow on intelligence-sharing and extremism but avoids collective interventions [1]. During Kazakhstan’s 2022 unrest and CSTO deployment, Uzbekistan (not a member) stayed out and signalled opposition to any such intervention on its soil [24]. Uzbekistan has also acted as a mediator with Russia in Afghan diplomacy, hosting conferences and facilitating evacuations and aid in 2021 [25]. Regionally, Mirziyoyev’s rapprochement with neighbours reduced frictions that once amplified Russian leverage. Projects like the planned railway from Uzbekistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan invite Russian participation to align incentives for regional stability [26]. Overall, ties have moved from alliance to estrangement and back to pragmatic partnership. Uzbekistan values Russia for arms, training, and diplomatic cover, but limits its footprint and avoids entangling alliances [1]. As of 2025, coordination is closer than in the previous decade, yet autonomy remains central.

Memberships & Treaties Timeline

  • 1992 – Foundational Agreements: Uzbekistan and Russia sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (May 1992). Uzbekistan joins the CIS Collective Security Treaty, aligning early with Moscow on security.
  • 1999 – Break from CST: Tashkent opts not to renew the Collective Security Treaty. Along with Georgia and Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan exits the alliance to pursue a more independent defence policy.
  • 2001 – SCO Founding Member: Uzbekistan becomes a founding member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Joins Russia, China, and Central Asian neighbours in a new forum on regional security and counterterrorism.
  • 2004 – Strategic Partnership: Presidents Vladimir Putin and Islam Karimov sign a Strategic Partnership Treaty (June 2004), pledging long-term political, economic and security cooperation.
  • 2005 – Andijan Fallout & Alliance: After Western criticism of the Andijan crackdown, Uzbekistan pivots to Moscow. In November 2005, a Treaty of Allied Relations includes mutual defence and base-access provisions.
  • 2005–2006 – Withdrawing from GUAM: Uzbekistan withdraws from the GUAM bloc. The exit signals retreat from U.S.-backed groupings and closer alignment with Russia.
  • 2006 – Return to CSTO: Uzbekistan rejoins the CSTO after seven years away, insisting on limits to deployments on its soil and skipping joint drills.
  • 2012 – CSTO Withdrawal: Uzbekistan suspends CSTO membership again (June 2012), citing disagreement with the alliance’s direction. From then, it pursues bilateral security ties.
  • 2016 – Leadership Transition: Karimov’s death and Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s accession trigger a rebalancing. Dialogue with Moscow intensifies while non-bloc policy continues.
  • 2020 – EAEU Observer Status: Uzbekistan becomes an observer in the EAEU, engaging on trade facilitation while avoiding binding integration on Russian terms.
  • 2022 – Neutrality in Ukraine War: Russia’s invasion tests the partnership. Uzbekistan calls for peace, does not recognise proxy republics, and maintains neutrality. Trade remains open.
  • Oct 2023 – Gas Supply Deal: Uzbekistan starts importing Russian gas via Kazakhstan under a two-year Gazprom contract, easing shortages without a formal gas union.
  • 2024 – Nuclear Energy Pact: A contract is signed for Rosatom to build a 330 MW SMR plant in Uzbekistan, deepening long-term energy cooperation.

Conclusion & Outlook

Uzbekistan’s ties with Russia will likely follow one of three paths, depending on regional dynamics and great-power competition: tightened alignment, continued hedging, or rising friction. In an alignment scenario, Tashkent could move closer by upgrading EAEU participation or revisiting CSTO ties if Western engagement fades and security threats mount. Indicators would include Uzbek acceptance of Russian-led initiatives it has resisted, a permanent Russian military presence, or rhetorical convergence in international fora. Short of that, deeper bilateral defence and preferential trade deals could still bind relations.

Continued hedging is the most probable course. Uzbekistan preserves strong ties with Russia through summits, projects, and arms without exclusive alliance commitments. It remains outside blocs, leverages EAEU observer status, and pursues parallel partnerships with China, the West, and the Muslim world. Indicators include renewed vows of non-alignment, investment in alternative corridors (e.g., trans-Caspian) reducing reliance on Russia, and consistent defence of policy sovereignty and neutrality. Uzbekistan’s balanced response to the Ukraine war, neither antagonising Moscow nor breaching international norms, typifies this approach. If sustained, combined with engagement in Chinese and European connectivity initiatives alongside Russian projects, and pragmatic management of labour migration, equilibrium can hold.

A friction scenario is less likely but plausible. It could arise if Moscow demands concessions Tashkent will not grant, such as recognition of annexations or hosting alliance forces. Perceived encroachments on sovereignty would trigger pushback. Domestic sentiment could also sour ties if mistreatment of migrants or chauvinism sparks backlash. Indicators would include a clear tilt toward alternative security partners, public criticism of Russian actions, or decisive shifts in energy logistics away from Russian routes. Tighter controls on re-exports or disputes over water and influence would further strain ties. Given geography and economic interdependence, outright rupture is unlikely. Yet incremental friction like a trade spat or diplomatic snub would mark a departure from the cordial status quo.

In practice, Uzbekistan is likely to keep hedging, adjusting the dial among Moscow, Beijing, Washington and others to maximise benefits. Mirziyoyev presents policy as “open, pragmatic and principled,” engaging all sides on Uzbek terms. Russia will remain crucial due to history, geography and economics. Yet the principle of avoiding overdependence on any single country will endure. If Moscow respects that independence, ties can flourish in balance. If a shock forces choices, the resilience of Uzbekistan’s multi-vector path will be tested. Watching signals like an EAEU decision, a long-term Russian investment, or Tashkent’s handling of the next regional crisis will show which trajectory emerges.

Literature

«Research Center on Security Policy» Non-governmental organisation

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