Russia–Kazakhstan relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union

Introduction

Kazakhstan was the last state to leave the USSR, in December 1991. It then established itself as a sovereign state under the presidency of Nursultan Nazarbayev, who remained at the head of the country for nearly 30 years, from 1991 to 2019. His successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, has been the country’s leader since his departure. Today, we will analyse relations between Kazakhstan and Russia since the fall of the USSR, exploring several areas of their relationship.

II) Politics

A New relationship

Between 1991 and the 2010s, the Russian Federation was presented as a strategic partner of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s landlocked position led it to forge ties with other nations in order to improve its capacity for projection and exchange. However, concerns began to arise within Kazakh circles following the Crimean War and Russian political statements. In 2014, Vladimir Putin declared that the Kazakhs had never had a state before the fall of the Soviet Union, a veiled way of questioning Kazakhstan’s legitimacy as a nation. In 2020, two members of the Duma, the Russian Assembly, also questioned the country’s territorial integrity. Russia’s neo-imperial policy in the post-Soviet space has led Kazakhstan to adopt a more distrustful attitude towards its partner in order to protect its sovereignty, especially since Kazakhstan’s borders are among those that Russia might want to integrate into a ‘greater Russia’. Faced with this attitude, Kazakhstan has adopted a ‘modus vivendi’ towards Russia, combining two elements: cooperation and defence of sovereignty. For instance, Nazarbayev rejected the proposal for a Eurasian Parliament, considering it a threat to the country’s sovereignty. On 19 March 2019, President Nursultan Nazarbayev resigned after 30 years at the helm of the country. However, he retained a certain degree of control over important institutions, notably the Security Council. His successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, undertook moderate liberalisation, abolishing the death penalty and creating the National Council of Public Trust. In terms of diplomacy, he resumed a position of independence, determined to protect his integrity. On 5 January 2021, the media outlet Kazakhstan Today published a statement by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Independence Above All, in which he declared that ‘every nation must write its own history, without succumbing to the influence of foreign ideology’. These new positions demonstrate Russia’s loss of soft power in relation to its former client states.

2) Qandy Quantar

In January 2022, violent protests rocked the country due to a sharp increase in oil prices. After a few days, the riots spread to the capital, which was set ablaze. The regime responded with violent repression and called on the Collective Security Treaty Organisation for help in restoring order. This organization is largely controlled by Russia, its major participant. As a result, Russian troops entered the capital and were tasked with protecting strategic points. Russia’s effective intervention and the country’s instability raised fears of a Russian takeover, but this did not happen. Nearly two weeks after being deployed, the troops withdrew. One might think that, following this event, the Kazakh leader would have been more favourable towards Russia, to whom he now owes his political life. However, he took advantage of the events to carry out a major political purge, notably by dismissing Narbaiev and his associates from key government posts, and asserting his authority.

3) War in ukraine

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led some observers to assume that Kazakhstan would pivot its foreign relations away from Russia towards the West. In June 2022, a few months after the Qandy Quantar, the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, was held. The Kazakh president was invited and, during one of his speeches, affirmed his political independence from Russia by stating that he did not recognise the separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. Kazakhstan’s relationship with Russia is reminiscent in some respects of that between Russia and Ukraine. The country still has a large Russian minority, particularly in the north, and part of the Kazakh population fears that Moscow may one day invoke the need to protect Russian speakers to justify intervention or annexation, as it did in Ukraine. Faced with this risk, a strong desire to ‘build a nation’ has emerged, illustrated by initiatives such as the promotion and teaching of the Kazakh language. Following this public humiliation, Putin decided to cut off the Novorossiysk Canal, a direct sanction for Tokaev’s impudence. This event contributed to the deterioration of relations between the two states, which now have a tacit agreement: Kazakhstan agrees to remain within Russia’s sphere of influence in exchange for the preservation of its sovereignty and legitimacy. Kazakhstan has taken numerous steps to break away from Russian influence, including switching from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet, moving the capital, and relocating Kazakh populations to the Russian border. The two countries are bound by a mutual dependence that allows them to move forward together despite disagreements on fundamental issues, notably the war in Ukraine.

III) Economical relations

The post-soviet era

Kazakhstan, the world’s largest landlocked country, covers an area of 2,724 km². Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country experienced an economic crisis due to the collapse in demand for heavy industry and its dependence on exports, particularly hydrocarbons. It was largely because of this dependence that they quickly reached an agreement with Russia and oil companies, signed in 1996, allowing for the construction of a pipeline in the Caspian Sea. The agreement provided for the construction of an oil pipeline connecting the Tengiz field (Kazakhstan) to the port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. This was completed in 2001. Kazakhstan benefited from investments by Russian companies such as Gazprom. The country thus maintains numerous economic ties with Russia, which were essential to its development after the fall of the USSR. As a result, Moscow has a significant hold over Kazakh exports, particularly to Europe. The Kazakhs have long been interested in the American project to transport oil and gas to Turkey via Azerbaijan and Georgia. However, they knew that the option of a pipeline under the Caspian Sea was unacceptable to Russia. It was therefore only a decade later, once the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline had become a reality, that Astana agreed to participate, and even then only by shipping oil by tanker across the Caspian Sea, rather than using the underwater pipeline supported by Washington. Although Kazakhstan has never granted Russia a veto over its foreign policy, it remains attentive to Moscow’s reactions.

The EEU

From the 2000s onwards, a shift was observed in Russian-Kazakh trade. Trade was boosted by regional integration, reaching nearly USD 5.2 billion in 2003. Trade multiplied between 2003 and 2018, generating nearly USD 18.5 billion in trade volume in 2018. Numerous agreements were signed as part of the cross-border cooperation programme between Kazakhstan and Russia . This concept builds on previous agreements, such as the 2006 agreement that facilitated border crossing procedures for residents of border regions, and underscores the importance of interregional collaboration in overall relations between Russia and Kazakhstan. In addition, the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union, which institutionalises the free movement of goods, services, capital and workers between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, marks a new stage in economic integration. This union establishes consultation to guide policy in key areas of the economy, such as industry, agriculture, energy and transport. Although cooperation remains intense, it is subject to external shocks. In 2014–2015, falling oil prices and Western sanctions against Russia complicated bilateral trade. Nevertheless, the two countries are seeking to strengthen their trade by diversifying sectors (agriculture, automotive industry, pharmaceuticals). The subject of trade between the two countries remains controversial, particularly due to the asymmetry of trade. Kazakh products struggle to find their place in the Russian market, while many Russian products are present in Kazakhstan, creating a significant trade deficit, which has only increased since the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union.

2020’s

Economically, Kazakhstan was severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and the fall in oil prices in 2020, a sector that accounts for one-third of GDP and more than 75% of export earnings. Growth fell to -2.5%, the budget deficit reached 4% of GDP and the poverty rate almost doubled in a few years. The government implemented a massive £15 billion stimulus package, partly financed by the Samrouk Kazyna sovereign wealth fund, to support businesses and households. This crisis has strengthened the desire to diversify the economy and reduce dependence on hydrocarbons through the ‘Kazakhstan-2050’ strategy, which aims to make the country one of the thirty most developed economies by 2050. Furthermore, dependence on hydrocarbons is a means for Russia to put pressure on Astana, and the Novorossiysk route has been blocked on several occasions, particularly following Tokayev’s statements on the war in Ukraine. Since the start of the war, trade between Russia and Kazakhstan has intensified. The years 2022 and 2023 even set records, with volumes of $26 billion and $27 billion respectively, including exports of dual-use goods likely to support the Russian war effort. Nearly half of foreign companies operating in Kazakhstan are now Russian, and both public and private groups linked to the Kremlin are showing strong interest in the Kazakh market. In this context, Moscow and Beijing are pursuing a common goal: to strengthen Kazakhstan’s economic integration into their spheres of influence, while partially distancing it from the West, without completely cutting off Russia’s access to the non-sanctioned world. China is now Astana’s main trading partner, with trade volume reaching $31.5 billion in 2023, up 30% from 2022. One flagship project illustrates this strategic cooperation: in June 2025, Moscow and Astana signed an agreement to build a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan, taking advantage of its significant uranium resources. At the same time, Beijing is also strengthening its influence, notably through the Belt and Road Initiative, which offers Kazakhstan an opportunity for economic and geopolitical diversification.

III) Military relationship

Since 1991, Kazakhstan has pursued a foreign policy aimed at diversifying its international partners, while maintaining a privileged relationship with Russia. Military and security cooperation consists of nearly 60 bilateral agreements, in addition to the two countries’ participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. These agreements cover a variety of areas: training, armaments, military installations and joint exercises.

Astana has also been collaborating with the Atlantic Alliance through the Kazakhstan–NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan, in place since 2006. Notably, Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian state participating in this programme. Within this framework, the country receives NATO support in counter-terrorism operations, immigration management, and emergency response to both natural and man-made disasters. Kazakhstan has managed to maintain a delicate balance between Moscow and Washington, even in the highly sensitive domain of national defence. Central Asia and its neighbouring countries remain marked by Cold War dynamics, and navigating this environment requires constant diplomatic flexibility. Nonetheless, President Nazarbayev has repeatedly emphasised that cooperation with NATO does not imply turning away from Russia, nor diminishing Moscow’s essential role in safeguarding Kazakhstan’s strategic interests.

The military alliance has been strengthened over the years with the signing of major treaties, such as the Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Alliance in the 21st Century (2013) and the new military cooperation agreement of 2020, which replaces the 1994 agreement. These texts provide for military training, the coordination of joint exercises and the transfer of weapons, consolidating the legal framework for cooperation.

Conclusion

The relations between Kazakhstan and Russia are characterized by a certain ambivalence between economic and military cooperation, and a desire for political emancipation. The invasion of Crimea and then Ukraine made the Kazakhs aware of the potential threat posed by Russia, despite their dependence on hydrocarbons and technological developments. Kazakhstan is attempting to rebalance an alliance that was previously unfavorable, while also seeking to diversify its partnerships. Nevertheless, a new rapprochement between the two countries can be observed, which could call into question Tokayev’s promises to build a “new Kazakhstan.”

Major agreements:

Alma-Ata Protocol (1991)

Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (1992)

Declaration of Eternal Friendship and Alliance (1998)

Russia–Kazakhstan–China Tripartite Agreement on the Border Tripoint (1999)

Agreement on the Use of the Baikonur Cosmodrome (2004, subsequently revised )

Agreement on Simplification of Border Crossing (2006)

Agreement on Customs Cooperation and Joint Border Control (2010s)

Protocol of Amendments to the 1992 Treaty of Friendship (2012)

Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Alliance in the 21st Century (2013)

Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea (2018)

Military Cooperation Agreement (2020)