Introduction
Armenia–NATO relations date back to 1992, when Armenia became a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Bilateral cooperation has since evolved within the frameworks of the Partnership for Peace program and the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), focusing primarily on political and security dialogue, defense reforms, and professional training of the armed forces.
Armenia has never pursued the goal of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), nor is such an aspiration or debate present in the current political or public discourse. Nevertheless, recent developments in Armenia, the wider region, and the international arena have created a favorable environment for advancing Armenia–NATO relations.
This article outlines the rationale for reassessing these relations and identifies key directions for deepening cooperation.
· Armenia–NATO: The Rationale for Reassessing Cooperation
The reassessment of Armenia–NATO relations stems from the new geopolitical realities, the growing diversity of security threats, and the need to ensure stability in the region. Moreover, there exist more than sufficient grounds for such a reassessment.
· Regional New Realities
In recent years, regional and global developments have given rise to new realities. Having received no adequate response from the CSTO to its appeals, Armenia has frozen its participation in the organization’s activities, abstains from voting, does not take part in its military exercises, has stopped paying membership fees, and has not appointed a permanent representative to the structurei.
The region has also been affected by broader international developments. As a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus has relatively weakened, a trend evident in its relations with both Yerevan and Baku.
In June 2025, the 12-day Israel–Iran war inflicted significant damage on Iran’s defense capabilities, weakening Tehran’s positions and influence across neighboring regions, including the South Caucasus.
At the same time, recent months have seen a noticeable increase in U.S. interest in the region — most visibly reflected in the August 8 meeting at the White House between President Donald Trump and the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, during which important agreements were reachedii.
The Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization process has gained new momentum, with the initialingiii of the “Treaty on Peace and the Establishment of Inter-State Relations” and the adoption of a Declaration of Peace marking important milestonesiv.
Progress is also emerging in the Armenia–Türkiye, NATO Ally, normalization process, with the implementation prospects of the 2022 agreements appearing increasingly realisticv.
These regional shifts create favorable conditions for the development of Armenia–NATO relations․ Reassessing the partnership would also contribute to balancing NATO’s engagement in the region. Currently, Armenia–NATO cooperation remains at the lowest level in the South Caucasus․
· Armenia’s foreign Policy of Diversification
Confronted with unprecedented security challenges since 2020, Armenia has adopted a foreign policy course of diversification aimed at strengthening its resilience and reducing dependence on a single power center. Since late 2022, official Yerevan has managed to establish expanding defense and technological cooperation with France and India.
Significant progress has also been made in broadening and deepening Armenia’s foreign relations. The country has established strategic partnerships with Georgia, Netherlands, and the United States, while agreements have been reached to elevate relations with France and the United Kingdom to a strategic level. A corresponding document is also being drafted with European Union.
Armenia’s relations with the European Union in particular have gained substantial momentum. This is evidenced by the deployment and extension of the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA), the provision of assistance from the European Peace Facility, the launch of dialogue on visa liberalization, the development of a new cooperation agenda, and the adoption by the Armenian National Assembly of a bill initiating the process of EU accession.
Against the backdrop of these multidirectional diplomatic efforts, tangible changes in relations with NATO have not yet been observed. Nevertheless, NATO cooperation could become an important component of Armenia’s diversification policy.
· Reform Agenda
Recent developments have reinforced the understanding in Armenia of the urgent need to transform its armed forces. Alongside efforts to diversify defense cooperation, on
November 12, 2024, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia published the first official document outlining the ongoing process of military transformation — the Concept for the Transformation of the Armed Forcesvi. The implementation of this concept is planned for 2024–2035.
The concept envisions a transition to a professional army, the creation of a professional non-commissioned officer corps, the establishment of a territorial defense system and an active reserve, the enhancement of the state border protection system, as well as tactical and strategic modernization, the strengthening of the army’s public image and educational role, and the reform of military education, among other priorities.
While Armenia cooperates with individual countries in the sphere of defense reforms, this cooperation remains limited in scope. Moreover, the study of defense reform experiences in Eastern European states demonstrates that no country has successfully implemented such reforms independently—without external assistance.
For Armenia as well, achieving the set objectives requires systemic support from partner countries and institutions. In this regard, NATO could play a particularly important role—both due to its extensive institutional experience and its firm commitment to democratic values.
· Reconsidering Armenia–NATO Cooperation
Given the aforementioned developments, a review of Armenia’s relations with NATO has become a timely and mature necessity. Moreover, such a process could contribute to the ongoing reform of the Armenian Armed Forces, enhance the country’s capacities in the areas of cybersecurity, countering hybrid threats, and crisis management, and broaden the scope of political dialogue — all without assuming any alliance-related obligations, only by developing partnership with NATO, based on demand-driven cooperation model.
In the context of strengthening bilateral cooperation, it is important to consider several factors, such as the complex relations between certain regional actors — for instance, Russia and Iran — and the Alliance, as well as Türkiye’s key role in the region. When revisiting its relations with the Alliance, Armenia should adopt the principle of “deepening cooperation without creating new challenges,” while maintaining regular consultations with NATO partners on emerging opportunities and risks.
To advance relations with the NATO, Armenia can make use of a number of programs and initiatives available to NATO partner states. Several possible directions are outlined below.
· Adoption of the ITPP
Since 2023, negotiations have been underway between Armenia and NATO regarding the establishment of a new “Individually Tailored Partnership Programme” (ITPP) to replace the existing Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). This new framework, introduced by the Alliance in 2021, has already been adopted by several non-member states.
Unlike the biannual planning cycle of the IPAP, the ITPP operates on a four-year framework, providing a more comprehensive, long-term, and coherent basis for cooperation that encompasses a wider range of areas.
Discussions are currently ongoing within NATO on granting the ITPP both to Armenia and Azerbaijan.
In this regard, the Armenian side should intensify its diplomatic efforts and engagement with all NATO member states — while not excluding the possibility of situational cooperation with Azerbaijan where appropriate.
Strengthening Armenia’s Resilience
Given the evolving security environment and the combination of old and emerging challenges facing Armenia, strengthening the country’s resilience remains a top priority. In this context, adopting NATO’s Resilience Baseline Requirements could prove highly beneficial in terms of objectively assessing national capacities and implementing effective reformsvii.
Established in 2021, this framework is designed to evaluate and enhance the resilience of both NATO member and partner states. The assessment is conducted across seven key indicators related to vital state and societal functions in times of crisis or armed conflict. Among NATO’s non-member partners, Switzerland, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ireland have already adopted the Resilience Baseline Requirements.
Armenia’s adoption of NATO’s Resilience Baseline and the inclusion of its principles in the future ITPP would contribute to reinforcing national and societal resilience, while enhancing security not only in the military domain but also across the civilian sector.
· Deepening Cooperation in the Field of Defense
Since the 2000s, Armenia’s cooperation with NATO has primarily focused on peacekeeping. Armenian peacekeepers have participated in NATO missions in
Afghanistan and Iraq and continue their engagement in the Kosovo mission, where their contingent was increased to 57 personnel in 2024.
To deepen bilateral cooperation, it would be advisable to strengthen Armenia–NATO collaboration within the framework of the Defense Capacity Building (DCB) initiative. Through this mechanism, NATO provides a wide range of assistance to non-member countries such as Georgia, Moldova, Iraq, Tunisia, and others.
For Armenia, the DCB framework could serve as an important platform for enhancing the efficiency of defense institutions, modernizing educational and training systems, increasing transparency in defense governance, and aligning security structures with internationally recognized standards.
Joint efforts between Armenia and NATO in this field should focus not only on technical and expert assistance but also on developing human capital—ensuring long-term stability and resilience within Armenia’s defense system.
· Deepening Cooperation with Centers of Excellence
NATO’s Centers of Excellenceviii (CoEs) are internationally specialized institutions that focus on research, training, doctrine development, and education in specific areas. Although they are not part of NATO’s official command structure, they support NATO operations by providing expertise, training, and sharing best practices. Each Centre of Excellence specializes in a particular field. For example:
· Estonia – Cybersecurity
· Lithuania – Energy security
· Finland – Hybrid threats
· Latvia – Strategic communications
· Slovenia – Mountain warfare
These Centers are open to cooperation with NATO partner countries. Partners can contribute personnel, experts, and participate in training exercises and research projects. Through collaboration with the Centers of Excellence, Armenia can gain valuable expertise and knowledge, and align its capabilities more closely with NATO standards in specific areas.
Summary
In conclusion, the review of Armenia–NATO relations is no longer a matter of choice but a necessity. Given regional realignments, the inactivity of the CSTO, and the ongoing
defense reform agenda, deepening cooperation with NATO can become a key component for strengthening Armenia’s security system and diversifying its foreign policy. NATO’s existing partnership framework allows Armenia to advance both its defense and civilian capabilities to international standards without assuming alliance obligations.
Narek Minasyan, Samvel Meliksetyan, Tigran Mughnetsyan
i https://www.hetq.am/hy/article/168098
ii https://www.primeminister.am/hy/foreign-visits/item/2025/08/07/Nikol-Pashinyan-working-visit-to-US/
iii https://www.mfa.am/hy/press-releases/2025/08/11/Initialed%20Arm-Az%20Peace%20Agreement%20text/13394
iv https://www.primeminister.am/hy/press-release/item/2025/08/09/Nikol-Pashinyan-visit-US-declaration/
v https://www.mfa.am/hy/press-releases/2025/09/12/Armenia_Turkiye/13439
vi https://mil.am/hy/news/12460
vii https://www.cimic-coe.org/handbook-entries/welcome-to-the-cimic-handbook/vii-resilience/7-2-seven-baseline-requirements/
viii https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68372.htm
