The Moscow Parade and the Zigzags of Armenia’s Foreign Policy

by RCSP

Today, on May 9, a military parade is being held in Moscow to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory over Germany in World War II. The parade is taking place under exceptional circumstances for the first time. Russia has declared a three-day ceasefire in the war, yet the Ukrainian side has not only rejected the proposal to do the same but also stated that the military equipment and personnel amassed in Red Square are considered legitimate targets.

While it was highly likely that Kyiv’s statements were primarily of psychological significance, for the Russian authorities—and President Putin personally—ensuring that the parade proceeds without disruptions is a critical operation, both domestically and internationally. It is no coincidence that numerous heads of state were invited to attend the event in Moscow. The issue, however, lies in the fact that, considering Russia’s—put mildly—negative international standing, many of the invitees declined the invitation. Among them was the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, who justified his refusal by citing the need to attend events in Baku. Nevertheless, it is evident that this rejection has deeper geopolitical motivations and strategic value, the development of which Azerbaijan will likely pursue in the near future.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was also invited to Moscow. Despite many actors in the Armenian political sphere advising him to decline the invitation, Pashinyan chose to accept it and is participating in the parade. This decision can be interpreted as an expression of the declared policy of “balancing and balanced” diplomacy. This is also how government circles are framing Pashinyan’s visit.

Ultimately, should Pashinyan’s presence in Moscow be regarded as an opportunity or a challenge? In essence, the answer to this question hinges on clarifying the objective that Armenia’s leadership is pursuing in its foreign policy. On one hand, Armenia has declared its intention to adopt a European integration course and to work toward EU accession. On the other hand, it envisions “balancing” as the maintenance of current levels of engagement with other partners during this process. However, in modern international relations, the interests of regional and geopolitical actors are often mutually exclusive. While Azerbaijan can afford to “balance” its relations with various players to a certain extent—thanks largely to its energy resources and strategic location—Armenia risks severe consequences by attempting a similar approach.

It may be assumed that the Armenian Prime Minister has only one way to partially neutralize the negative perceptions surrounding his participation in the parade. That would be returning with agreements that carry tangible significance for Armenia’s sovereignty. This refers primarily to a potential reduction in Russia’s influence in Armenia, for example, through the withdrawal of Russian border guards from the Armenian-Iranian and Armenian-Turkish frontiers. Yet even in this case, Pashinyan’s visit to Moscow is likely to impart an uncomfortable subtext to Armenia–West relations.

Robert Ghevondyan

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