The development of Azerbaijan–China relations has gained remarkable momentum, especially over the past few years. Within the span of a single year, the two sides signed agreements elevating their relations first to a strategic level, and this year—to a comprehensive level. For China, Azerbaijan is primarily of interest in terms of logistics, and only then as an investment environment. Azerbaijan, in turn, is attempting to diversify its foreign policy, particularly in the context of insuring itself against tensions with the West. Moreover, within the logic of political bargaining with Russia, China may also serve as an additional asset for Azerbaijan. This is especially relevant now, given that Russia, entangled in Ukraine, has become a “convenient object” of political trade for Azerbaijan. Put simply, Azerbaijan’s role has become so vital for Moscow that, in exchange for Baku’s support, Russia often pays a disproportionately high price, while, in effect, lacking real leverage over Azerbaijan’s foreign policy.
However, there is another actor that is, to put it mildly, not enthusiastic about the unfolding dynamic—Turkey. Over the past 2–3 years, Turkish-Azerbaijani relations have shown signs of regression. First, following the signing of the “Shusha Declaration,” there has been no tangible progress on joint integration projects. Moreover, Azerbaijan signed a strategic agreement with Russia, which includes a clause obligating the exchange of intelligence data regarding third countries. Additionally, Turkey’s hopes for unblocking regional infrastructure have not materialized, as Azerbaijan continues to put forward additional conditions—first and foremost, the demand for the deployment of Russian forces. In practice, Azerbaijan has dismantled the Russian-Turkish monitoring center in Aghdam, resulting in Turkish armed forces losing their only foothold in the South Caucasus. Erdoğan publicly declared that “they entered Karabakh,” a statement in Azerbaijan interpreted as an attempt to usurp the laurels of the 44-day war. Eventually, the Armenia–Turkey border was briefly opened for 10 days for humanitarian aid deliveries, prompting backlash in Baku, where Erdoğan was accused of taking an “anti-Turkic” stance.
To all these external factors, we must now add the increasingly apparent trend of Turkey being bypassed in Azerbaijan–China relations. It is evident that Ankara had a vested interest in trilateral projects involving China, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. However, the “little brother,” once aspiring to play that role, is now pursuing its own game—disregarding Ankara’s preferences and strategic interests. So far, Turkish jealousy has manifested mostly symbolically, as seen in the aforementioned gestures. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that Erdoğan might resort to more decisive measures if Azerbaijan continues to ignore Turkey’s growing unease.
For instance, one might observe that—however difficult it may be to imagine—certain developments in the emerging geopolitical landscape are aligning Ankara’s preferences more closely with Yerevan’s perspectives, with Azerbaijani positioning standing as the primary obstacle. While these shared preferences are still insufficient to bring about a decision to open the Armenian-Turkish border, it is possible that the cumulative effect of these dynamics could eventually lead to such a development.
Robert Ghevondyan
