The August 8 meeting in Washington and the subsequent trilateral declaration marked a pivotal and transformative step in the process of normalizing Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. From a practical perspective, particular significance lies in Articles 3 and 4 of the declaration, which address the unblocking of regional communications, the fundamental principles underpinning this process, and the establishment of TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity). This article presents an interpretation of Article 3, exploring potential practical solutions stemming from it, while also touching upon the practical implications associated with Article 4.
Unimpeded Communication Between Mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan
Article 3 of the Washington Declaration, while affirming the opening of communications between the two states on the basis of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and jurisdiction, also stipulates that “these efforts shall include unimpeded communication between the mainland of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic through the territory of Armenia, with reciprocal benefits for Armenia in both international and domestic communications.”
The phrase “unimpeded communication” has led some to interpret this provision as implying the establishment of a corridor for Azerbaijan across Armenian territory. Azerbaijani and Turkish media outlets, politicians, and analysts, in commenting on these arrangements, have predominantly employed the expression “Zangezur Corridor” to describe the route traversing Armenia’s south. The extraterritorial connotations of the term corridor are largely linked to Baku’s insistence during 2021–2023 that the road through Syunik should be accorded the same status as the Lachin Corridor. Additionally, the early-2000s proposal envisioning a swap—granting Azerbaijan an extraterritorial road through Meghri in exchange for the Lachin Corridor connecting Nagorno-Karabakh—has further contributed to the conflation, in Armenian political discourse and media vocabulary, of the concepts “transport corridor”[1] and “extraterritorial corridor.
First, as noted in the footnote, the term presupposes primarily a system of international or interstate communications, whereas in Armenian discourse it is often employed in the sense of an extraterritorial route.
That part of Article Three, which makes explicit reference to the principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and jurisdiction, while additionally stipulating that the connection between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic must pass through the territory of Armenia, cannot—under any interpretation or in any practical implementation—be construed as establishing an extraterritorial corridor. For the Armenian side, these principles are foundational, and indeed the primary reason why the Azerbaijani and Russian interpretations of the “November 9” statement, as well as the proposed practical arrangements that omitted them, were deemed unacceptable.
At the same time, judging from statements made by both Azerbaijani and Armenian officials, the notion of unimpeded communication implies:
- Technical arrangements designed to minimize the duration of border-crossing procedures and to reduce other procedural costs associated with crossing the frontier.
- The presence of a mediating organization—in this case American—which, on the basis of Armenian legislation and the aforementioned principles, would be entrusted with carrying out certain intermediary functions both at the border and along the route. Importantly, the involvement of an international organization does not replace but merely supplements the functions of the relevant Armenian authorities. According to official statements[2], the Azerbaijani side also expects such mediation to provide security guarantees for individuals and cargo transiting the route—arrangements that could be implemented through private security companies or similar mechanisms.
It may be assumed that Azerbaijan, relying on the “unimpeded communication” clause, will seek practical solutions that provide maximally simplified and expedited border-crossing procedures for its goods and citizens.
Another issue related to this provision, which may become the subject of negotiations and clarification, concerns the distinction between Azerbaijan–Azerbaijan (Nakhichevan) connectivity via Armenia (through Meghri) and the regulations and arrangements governing international transit and passenger flows in the opposite direction. The distinction is important because, if the railway connection through Meghri is restored, in addition to Armenia–Azerbaijan domestic and bilateral flows, the main traffic will inevitably be associated with transit flows to third countries (Iran, Turkey, Russia, Central Asia), as well as incoming flows from these states and regions—volumes which will be dominant.
Reciprocal Advantages in Domestic and International Connectivity
For the Armenian side, the reference to reciprocal advantages represents an important principle. Unlike the provision guaranteeing unimpeded communication between the two parts of Azerbaijan, however, this principle lacks the same degree of specificity. Nevertheless, its parameters will directly influence the practical application of that guarantee.
As I noted in my previous article, transport routes traversing Nakhichevan are of critical significance for Armenia’s internal and international connectivity. The link between Armenia’s southern regions (Meghri, Kapan) and the rest of the country, when routed through Nakhichevan, is almost twice as fast as the alternative through Armenia’s own territory. By contrast, for Azerbaijan, communication with Nakhichevan through Iran or the Araks-adjacent section of Armenia entails virtually no difference in travel time.
The principle of reciprocity may therefore encompass harmonized customs tariffs, streamlined border-crossing procedures, technical facilitation measures, and so forth. Within the context of the signed Declaration, this element constitutes the single most consequential point for Armenia requiring further clarification in subsequent negotiations. Indeed, the extent to which the parameters of Azerbaijani transit through southern Syunik approximate this principle could decisively affect both the interpretive quality of the agreement and the benefits Armenia may derive. According to the text, the practical distinction lies in the absence of American mediating organizations at the Armenia–Azerbaijan border and along the Nakhichevan route, unlike[3] in the case of Azerbaijani transit via southern Syunik.
The principle of reciprocity may be applied both to domestic connectivity arrangements—albeit under different principles, tariffs, and regulations—and to the regime governing international transit. Moreover, differentiated exchanges of non-identical benefits and regulations are conceivable, reflecting the divergent priorities of the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides.
In this sense, reciprocity—when juxtaposed with Azerbaijan’s demand for “unimpeded communication”—emerges as a potentially most conflict-prone element of the agreement. Yet, with carefully crafted practical solutions and negotiated exchanges, it could in fact turn advantageous for Armenia. Here, Armenia’s capacity for effective negotiation, alongside the ability to put forward offers that appeal to Azerbaijani interests, may substantially shape the eventual outcomes.
From a practical standpoint, despite the diversity of interpretations surrounding this provision, the reciprocal benefits primarily pertain to:
Domestic rail connectivity linking Armenia’s southern regions through the Yerasakh–Nakhichevan–Julfa–Meghri line, and
International connectivity with Iran via Nakhichevan’s Julfa junction.
In terms of security, rail transport—particularly in the initial phase, and in light of the absence of international guarantors within Azerbaijani territory—appears the most preferable option for the Armenian side.
Multimodal Infrastructure and the Principle of Reciprocity
To render the agreement more advantageous for the Armenian side, it is essential to construct a multimodal terminal in Meghri. Such a facility would enable the transport of concentrate from the Agarak copper-molybdenum mine by rail to international markets. At the same time, it would allow cargo arriving from Iran by truck to be transferred to rail and shipped to Yerevan, thereby significantly reducing the cost of transporting Iranian imports.
While these same goods could, in theory, also transit through the Iranian Julfa – Azerbaijani Julfa – Nakhichevan – Yerevan railway line, the heavy congestion of the Julfa junction, coupled with the technical requirement to shift from Iran’s European standard gauge (1435 mm) to the Russian gauge (1520 mm), would result in additional time losses. Moreover, the limited capacity of Armenia’s railway network, particularly in the initial phase, must also be taken into account.
Should the Kapan–Midjnavan (Minjivan) railway be restored, the enshrinement of this principle would also enable copper and molybdenum extracted from several mines in Syunik to be exported to international markets at a reduced cost. The same holds for the potential exploitation of the Svarants iron ore deposit (estimated at approximately 1.5 billion tons of reserves), one of the largest in the region. The deposit’s geographic position is highly advantageous: it lies close to both the North–South highway corridor (facilitating efficient export of raw material toward Meghri) and the Kapan railway station slated for restoration.
These new export prospects for various mineral resources could prove attractive to the current U.S. administration and may bring additional American and Western investment into the TRIPP project. It is worth noting that as early as 2011, the Chinese company Fortune Oil[4] had expressed practical interest in exploiting the Svarants iron ore deposit.
Within the broader framework of applying the principle of reciprocity, one might also consider the restoration of Armenian access to the Goris–Kapan highway segments (such as Eyvazlu and others) that came under Azerbaijani control in 2021, through simplified procedures for Armenian use. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the principles of border delimitation (retention of minor cross-border communications by the side that has historically operated them, with reciprocal territorial compensation of equal area in other sectors) also imply solutions favorable to Armenia regarding this road.
That said, aside from ensuring connectivity for a few border communities, the strategic importance of this road will diminish once the North–South highway is completed. Moreover, the transferred segments hold no meaningful communicational value within Azerbaijani territory. Accordingly, resolution of this issue should primarily be pursued within the framework of border delimitation, based on the interests of local communities. Nevertheless, during negotiations, it could also be raised in the broader context of the Washington agreements.
Issues Related to the Fourth Clause of the Washington Declaration
The fourth clause of the Washington Declaration concerns the establishment of the framework for implementing the TRIPP initiative, as well as the possibility of involving third parties in the project by mutual consent. These may encompass legal, financial, and economic issues, as well as practical questions pertaining to infrastructure. Based on Armenian official statements, it can be inferred that the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) envisions not only the construction and operation of railways, but also the development of other forms of connectivity, including energy and telecommunications infrastructure.
As previously noted, rail transport is expected to serve as the primary mode of communication—due to considerations of convenience, safety, cost efficiency, and the smooth functioning of the Middle Corridor. However, prior to the full commissioning of railway lines, and once TRIPP’s fundamental parameters are clarified, it would be possible to immediately open borders and communication channels between the two countries, including automobile routes linking Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan via Armenia. These could include, for instance: Armenia border – Goris – Angeghakot – Bichenek – Nakhichevan, Ganja – Mravdag Tunnel – Sotk – Selim Pass – Areni – Sharur, Nakhichevan – Yerevan – Ijevan – Gazakh.
The opening of automobile routes could serve as the first positive confidence-building measure, particularly since Azerbaijan’s newly constructed railway to the Armenian border will only be completed in the summer of 2026, while Armenia has assessed the restoration of the Meghri section as requiring approximately three[5] years. During this period, the continued closure of borders and communications could significantly undermine the positive dynamics in interstate relations, deprive both sides of mutually beneficial cooperation and revenues, delay the introduction of confidence-building mechanisms, and foreclose opportunities for establishing international and domestic connectivity.
It should be noted that railway connections between Nakhichevan–Azerbaijan, Armenia–Iran, Armenia–Russia, and Azerbaijan–Turkey are already technically feasible through the existing railway network. To operationalize these routes, only minor restorations are required: approximately 0.7 km at the Armenia–Turkey border (Dogukapı–Akhurik) and 4 km at the Yeraskh–Sadarak section. Although the Baku–Tbilisi–Ayrum–Gyumri–Kars/Yerevan–Yeraskh–Nakhichevan route is longer than alternatives passing through Syunik and Ijevan, these alternatives are still shorter than the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars line. In the case of Nakhichevan, moreover, the existing railway through Armenian territory constitutes the only available railway connection between the exclave and mainland Azerbaijan.
Therefore, until new alternative routes are constructed, it would be both feasible and beneficial to open the existing communication channels.
Issues Related to the Construction of the Railway Passing Through Meghri
Among the issues concerning the construction of the Meghri railway—which I will address in greater detail in my subsequent article dedicated to the Kars-Iğdır-Dilucu railway—it is important to note the requirement not to replicate the 44 km Soviet-era alignment. The previous route largely followed the course of the Aras River in a zigzag pattern, significantly reducing train speeds and overall capacity. Consequently, extensive engineering works and tunnel construction will be required, which could also reduce the route length by approximately 10–15% while substantially increasing both capacity and transit speed. Without these improvements, under current conditions, the line cannot accommodate more than 4–5 million tons annually, whereas Azerbaijani and Turkish plans envisage volumes of up to 15 million tons. However, construction along a new alignment may further delay the project’s completion.
Azerbaijan’s considerations regarding the Aras-aligned route also include the parallel construction of a road. Although technically feasible, this, like the railway, requires extensive engineering works, including tunnels and viaducts, which could substantially increase the cost of infrastructure in this section without materially improving the quality or speed of road transport connecting Nakhchivan to mainland Azerbaijan, especially given existing alternative routes.
The passage of pipelines, electrical infrastructure, cables, and similar communications through this section is also undesirable, due to geopolitical factors (proximity to Iran), topographical constraints (narrow terrain between the Aras River and the mountains), and geographical optimization (deviation from a direct line increases length). For communications passing through Nakhchivan, the Sisian–Bichenek section represents a more optimal route, whereas for any transit from Baku or central and northern Azerbaijan to Turkey or western destinations, the most efficient and secure route, from a geopolitical standpoint, remains the line passing through northern Armenia (Agstev Valley–Vanadzor–Gyumri). During the Soviet period, the main gas pipeline from Azerbaijan to Ijevan also ran through northern Armenia, and its restoration is strategically important for Armenia to diversify gas supplies from Azerbaijan and Central Asia. In the context of implementing the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline[6]—which would allow Turkmen and Kazakh gas to be exported to Europe via the Turkmenbashi–Baku route—the shortest and most optimal path through the South Caucasus also runs through northern Armenia.
Conclusion
The formulations of the Washington Declaration provide broad opportunities for domestic, bilateral, and international connectivity for both Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, they require subsequent cooperation under a “win-win” model, which could significantly enhance the practical implementation of the principles outlined in the declaration, both in terms of national interests and international transit considerations.
Samvel Meliksetyan
[1] A transport corridor generally denotes a system of various linear communications—such as highways, railways, electric and telecommunication networks, pipelines, and the like—that traverse the territories of multiple cities, regions, or even countries, and are directed toward a common destination (for example, China–Europe, Berlin–Baghdad, etc.).
[2] https://president.az/ru/articles/view/69968
[3] https://rcsp.am/entry/8193/naxijevani-transportayin-kaperi-xndiry-yev-hh-naxijevan-arbejan-transportayin-kapi-hnaravor-lucumnery/
[4] https://news.am/rus/news/44681.html
[5] https://rus.azatutyun.am/a/31621559.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[6] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans-Caspian_Gas_Pipeline
