To assess the events that have taken place in Armenia in recent months, it is important to compare them with the developments taking place around Armenia and neighboring countries. The trends present in international relations are becoming increasingly noticeable in the region. Six months after Trump’s return, US policy is beginning to show signs of stabilization, while other actors are trying to engage in the South Caucasus according to their interests. In such a situation, Russia is trying to preserve the remnants of its influence by employing both traditional and new technologies in Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.
Russian Involvement Attempts Around the Confrontation Between Armenian Authorities and High-Ranked Clergy in the Armenian Apostolic Church
All processes with great public resonance in Armenia are assessed as opportunities to assume a role in the political field and accumulate political capital by the political opposition. In 2020 it was the war; in 2021 and 2022, “saving” Artsakh and liberating Armenia’s occupied territories; in 2023, the ethnic cleansing of Artsakh; in 2024, the border delimitation and demarcation processes of several villages in Tavush. In 2025, the confrontation of the authorities and the church hierarchy has become such an occasion. Not only Armenia’s radical opposition has consolidated around this issue and is trying to exert influence, but also a multitude of Russian political figures, experts, journalists, and even show business representatives.
Moreover, the “Ivanishvili” operation successfully implemented in Georgia years ago, which was introduced into the political field liberalized by Saakashvili and successfully undermined Georgia’s European integration attempts, was assessed in Moscow as a successful example of action. To replicate this example and not lose Russian influence in Armenia as well, Russian-Armenian oligarch Samvel Karapetyan, owner of “Armenian Electric Networks” CJSC (AEN), was dispatched from Russia to Armenia. The latter immediately proceeded to “fulfill his duties” by declaring that “a small group has attacked the Armenian Apostolic Church, and if this issue is not resolved in the political field, they will participate in solving the problem in their own ways.” However, Armenian authorities assessed this statement as an illegal threat, which resulted in Samvel Karapetyan’s arrest on charges of “making a public call to seize power.”
Simultaneously, discussion began in the National Assembly on legislation forming the basis for AEN nationalization, which, incidentally, had been discussed long before the mentioned incident and concluded on July 3 with the adoption of the law. Samvel Karapetyan began publishing opposition political-ideological messages from detention, whose main emphasis concerns Armenia’s foreign policy and wrong behavior toward the “main ally” – Russia. It should be noted that the “church” theme is barely mentioned in these messages. In Russia, Karapetyan’s arrest was assessed as an “illegal action against their citizen,” while Russian State Duma ruling faction deputy K. Zatulin declared that “Samvel Karapetyan will become the leader of the Armenian people.”
Discovery of a Coup Plan Through Terrorism and Russia’s Position
On June 24, 2025, Civic.am news outlet published a document describing a detailed plan for implementing a coup in Armenia. According to this plan, radical opposition members should act over 3 months through influencing society and gradually increasing distrust regarding the authorities’ actions. Several sections of the plan mentioned the necessity of participation by a “Russian side representative” and a “representative of the Armenian diaspora residing in Russia.” According to the published document, the actions should culminate on September 20-21, when, against a pre-programmed emotional and chaotic background, at the call of one of the opposition leaders, the people should take to the streets and implement a revolution.
Immediately the next day, on June 25, the Investigative Committee published recordings of participants in the movement called “Srbazan” (Holy) of clergyman Ter Bagrat Galstanyan and their phone conversations, which apparently create the impression that these people had planned to organize a terrorist attempt to seize power. In subsequent days, the active involvement of other individuals also became known. The published recordings spoke of “shooting several people against the wall,” “breaking shop windows and burning cars,” “cutting trolleybus wires,” “breaking government websites and blowing up tunnels,” and more. At the same time, “about 10 cars should create accidents in the city streets, after which a major traffic jam would arise and people would no longer be needed.” The publications also mention involving former military personnel, police officers, “serious guys” who, according to the interlocutors, are ready to take actions.
These publications were followed by a series of arrests, one of which – the detention of Mikayel Ajapahyan, Primate of the Shirak Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church – raised a great uproar because Ajapahyan had gone to Ejmiatsin and taken refuge in the Mother See.
Russian media and expert circles began actively accusing Armenian authorities of “attacks against the opposition and the church.” However, official Moscow mainly noted that what was happening was Armenia’s internal affair, and they were only “carefully following the development of events.” Noteworthy are the words of Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov, where he practically violates the norms of international relations ethics by characterizing the ongoing events from the perspective of Armenia’s radical opposition. In response to such behavior, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, during a joint press conference with EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, called on Lavrov not to interfere in Armenia’s internal affairs.
Escalation of Russia-Azerbaijan Relations
Parallel to the described events, Russian-Azerbaijani relations sharply deteriorated. The main occasion was a law enforcement operation in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg, which resulted in the killing of two Azerbaijani brothers accused of connections with the mafia. This was followed by a diplomatic crisis accompanied by mutual statements, cancellation of visits and Russian cultural events in Azerbaijan. In addition, employees of one of the Russian news outlets were arrested and brutally beaten in Azerbaijan, accused of espionage in favor of Russia. The Russian Foreign Ministry called on its citizens to exercise caution when visiting Azerbaijan.
It is important to note that, unlike Armenia’s radical opposition and persons of Armenian origin living in Russia, no publicly recognized Azerbaijani came forward in favor of Russia against their own authorities during the Russian-Azerbaijani conflict. While in the case of Azerbaijan residents, the problem may lie in the fact that Azerbaijan is an authoritarian state where opposition representatives are not free in their actions and the bold usually end up in prison, in the case of Azerbaijanis living in other countries, especially in Russia, this fact can be explained exclusively by the presence of consciousness of loyalty to Azerbaijan’s interests, even against Russia’s interests.
Discovery of New Information About Regional Developments and Probable Reasons for Russia’s Actions
On July 2, 2025, information was published on the Carnegie Foundation’s page by a foreign expert, and separately in Middle East Eye, that the US had made a proposal regarding ensuring Azerbaijan-Nakhijevan connection through Armenia’s Syunik region, and that the leaders of the two countries would meet in the United Arab Emirates in the near future. This information came to fill the missing link of logical connection in the described events. On one hand, there is a high probability that Russian interests are not taken into account in US proposals, and they focus on Armenian-Azerbaijani compromise, which could have been grounds for Russia to implement actions to disrupt these programs in various directions. On the other hand, the possibility of a high-level meeting could further advance the already sufficiently autonomous Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement process – a process over which Russia currently seems to have no direct levers of influence.
In Armenia’s case, these directions include hybrid actions through political forces of Russian influence within Armenia, dispatching of Russians of Armenian origin, coup attempts, and possible economic tools. The toolkit against Azerbaijan is not as diverse, considering the authoritarian regime and the Turkish factor. However, in all cases, the actions are coordinated with considerations of increasing the probability of overall success in case of achieving success in any direction.
Conclusion
Russia’s policy toward the region remains the same – to try to restore as much as possible the scope of influence it had before 2020 and keep all three South Caucasus states in its sphere of influence, or at minimum, never allow conflict settlements between and within the three South Caucasus states. To achieve this goal, all means available in Russia’s toolkit are employed – from hybrid and proxy actions to open threats, blackmail, terrorism, and more.
The capabilities of Azerbaijan and Georgia to confront this situation are primarily the problems of those countries. However, Armenia has no right to endanger the democratic system achieved at the cost of great sacrifices and the process of strengthening statehood. Therefore, Armenian authorities are obliged to undertake surgical measures to prevent illegal actions in Armenia, reduce Russian influence, increase resilience, and continuously improve the security system. Our recommendations on this topic are described in detail in the joint work “Basic Dependencies of the Republic of Armenia on the Russian Federation: Threats and Solutions.” On the other hand, if the information about the high-level meeting in the UAE is correct, then both Armenia and Azerbaijan should be interested in making progress in the settlement process, especially now.
Areg Kochinyan
Robert Ghevondyan
