Following the deployment of the EU monitoring mission on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, border incidents have dramatically decreased. This is being documented in Armenia, the European Union, and elsewhere. Even pessimists who previously claimed that “binoculars and pens” couldn’t have security significance now agree with this fact. Experience has showcased that the presence of observers limits the possibilities for provocations, both directly from Azerbaijan and through Azerbaijan by other countries, primarily Russia. It’s not surprising that there are strongly negative attitudes toward the EU monitoring mission in Baku and Moscow.
After January 29, 2025, when the EUMA term was extended for another 2 years, the main discourse on this issue circulated in the context of the “peace agreement” provision that no third-country forces would be deployed at the border. However, the agreement has not yet been signed, which means the EU observers will not be leaving yet. On the other hand, the word “border” explicitly written in the agreement allows for maintaining the main functions of the mission through certain modifications even if the agreement is signed.
The incidents in March-April 2025, where Azerbaijan accused Armenia of firing and occasionally fired in the direction of Armenia, have come to international attention. The EU mission’s objective assessments of the situation have contributed to this awareness. International responses to this border tension have been prompt. In particular, French Foreign Minister Baron announced about his country’s concerns, noting the possibility of expanding the EU mission to overcome these problems.
We at the Research Center on Security Policy feel it necessary to emphasize that we have repeatedly noted the importance of expanding the EU monitoring mission. We are convinced that increasing the number of observers and the range of represented states could dramatically increase the effectiveness of this component of Armenia’s security enhancement. We believe maximum effectiveness of the EU monitoring mission could be expected with up to 1,000 observers. This number is proportionally comparable to the monitoring mission in Georgia. The Russian-Georgian border is about 920km, but only 200km is subject to monitoring. About 200 observers actively work in that 200km section. The Armenia-Azerbaijan border is about 1,000km and requires active monitoring throughout. Currently, 209 observers are deployed there. Their work efficiency is limited due to the objective difficulties of operating in such a large area. Therefore, 1,000 observers are needed in Armenia to effectively monitor the entire length of the border.
Regarding possible negative reactions from Baku or Moscow, these cannot be more important than strengthening Armenia’s security. Moreover, if Azerbaijan wants to remove the EU mission from the border, increasing the number of observers and involved parties could provide additional incentive to promptly sign the Peace Agreement and, according to the agreed point, remove observers from the border.
Robert Ghevondyan
