The statements by the parties about the conclusion of peace agreement negotiations have received positive and warm signals from the outside world, but have also sparked sharp reactions in Armenia’s internal political field. While the political force forming the government speaks in defense of the agreement, the approaches of opposition representatives differ. Opposition groups presenting themselves as “neutral” political forces primarily demand the publication of the agreement’s text, while radical opposition members criticize known points of the agreement and qualify the document as “anti-Armenian”.
According to radical opposition members, the problems start from the point of mutual territorial integrity recognition. They argue that it is suspicious that Azerbaijan recognizes 29,743 sq. km of RA territorial integrity through the document. It is worth noting that this is an obvious manipulation, as according to official communications from Armenia and Azerbaijan, the agreement contains a clause on mutual recognition of territorial integrities, and according to the mutually confirmed border demarcation and delimitation regulation, the basis for the process is the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration. Therefore, the numeric expression of RA territorial integrity, even if not explicitly stated in the agreement’s text, is still affirmed through the combination of two documents signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Another disagreement among opposition members relates to the mutual withdrawal of international court claims. Although in this field Armenia may expect certain advantages over Azerbaijan, international legal processes also contain risks for us. First, it is unclear what decision will be made regarding enormous financial claims against Armenia initiated by Azerbaijan. Moreover, in recent years, Azerbaijan has already demonstrated a dismissive attitude towards international court decisions (for example, the demand to unblock the Lachin Corridor), and there are no grounds to believe that even in the case of victory, Armenia or Artsakh Armenians would be able to compel Azerbaijan to execute court verdicts.
Finally, a large wave of discontent relates to the point of refraining from deploying third-party forces, as they believe this excludes the EU observation mission. Perhaps some opposition members genuinely have concerns about the suspension of the observation mission’s work, but reasonable doubts arise when others are selflessly struggling to not close the path for the potential return of Russian special services to the Armenia-Azerbaijan border.
Robert Ghevondyan
